Talk:William Raborn

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The Magnitude of the Accomplishment[edit]

Raborn's main claim to fame was masterminding the development of the Polaris program. I think the magnitude of the accomplishmnet deserves more coverage in the article. I therefore propose insertion of the following paragraphs under this heading. I can do the insertion if there are no objections -- or suggested changes.

Admiral Raborn's accomplishment in the Polaris program ranks in both magnitude and value to the nation with the wartime development of the atomic bomb and the development of the nuclear submarine by Admiral Rickover. When assigned to head the project in 1955 the U.S. did not have even a land-based intercontinental missile. The Army had a liquid-fueled Jupiter missile of intermediate range, but it was 60 feet in length and weighed 55-tons. Building a submarine of those proportions was out of the question. Also, Jupiter would have required the storage and handling large volumes of highly volatile liquid fuels (liquid oxygen LOX and rocket propellant-1 RP-1). Raborn's task therefore was, not only to develop a way to carry and launch missiles from a submerged submarine, but to develop an entirely new missile of advanced design. This required the simultaneous development of a new missile launch system, a navigation, guidance and target system, a thermonuclear warhead, and a re-entry cone.

In addition to the technical requirements, Raborn had to co-ordinate all the efforts of the civilian contractors as well as get the necessary support and assistance from Army, Air Force and Navy organizations, and from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory for the nuclear warhead development. The project ended up with over 20,000 separate contracts with a total cost of $3.5 billion.

The project scope became so complicated with many simultaneous and parallel paths that the Navy contracted with Booz Allen Hamilton to develop a project management system to guide the planning and decision making throughout the project. The resulting system, named Project Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) was a critical path evaluation tool for on-schedule delivery that allowed Raborn to monitor the progress of the multiple and often inter-dependant tasks against his completion schedule.

To avoid the hazards of liquid fuels, Raborn pursued the use of solid-fuel propellants. The navy's prime contractor, Lockheed, now Lockheed Martin, was successful in developing a solid-fueled missile that would meet the range requirements, but it weighed 80 tons, much too big for submarine use. The first big breakthrough was the discovery that the addition of aluminized particles into the solid-fuel would significantly increase rocket power. At the same time, in the fall of 1956, the nuclear scientists at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory found a way to reduce the size of a thermonuclear warhead. These two breakthroughs led to the design of a solid-fueled missile that would be small enough to fit within the diameter of the Skipjack class nuclear submarines already being built. Thus, the Polaris program was given birth. The Polaris A-1 missile was 28-ft. long, 4.5 ft. in diameter and weighed only 15 tons. The delivery date was estimated to be 1965.

To insure the accuracy of the Polaris missiles, it was first necessary to fix the firing position of the submarine quickly and accurately while submerged. Celestial navigation was dependant on clear weather and other electronic navigation systems were subject to fouling by the enemy. Satellite navigation systems were not yet available. The answer was the development of Ships Inertial Navigation System (SINS) an entirely new navigation system based on dead reckoning.[1]

After Russia launched the first Sputnik in October 1957, Raborn was asked to what extent the Polaris program could be accelerated. He promised that, for an additional 350 million dollars, Polaris could be operational in 1960 provided the range requirement could be reduced form 1500 miles to 1200 miles. The program change was approved and Raborn got all contractors to agree on a priority schedule.[2] .

At Electric Boat the keel had been laid for the second Skipjack class submarine, to be named the USS Scorpion (SSN-589). To give the Polaris program a jump-start, the building of Scorpion was delayed and the keel was cut to allow the insertion of a cylinder 130 feet in length, which would contain 16 vertical Polaris missile tubes. This first Fleet Ballistic Missile(FBM) submarine was named the USS George Washington (SSBN-598). She was commissioned two years later on 30 December 1959.

As Lockheed started producing missiles, Raborn started testing them, launching first from Cape Canaveral and then from a converted cargo ship. As soon as the George Washington completed her sea trials, on July 20, 1960 she carried out the first launching of a missile from a submerged submarine. The first and subsequent tests were successful. In November 1960, the George Washington started the first deterrent patrol of a ballistic missile submarine. Thus Raborn was 5-years ahead of his first estimate for completion of Polaris, he met his accelerated schedule of being operational by 1960, and was more than 3-years ahead of the original mandate of achieving interim capability by early 1963. End of suggested insertion.Tvbanfield (talk) 16:01, 4 March 2008 (UTC)[reply]

References

  1. ^ http://www.history.navy.mil/colloquia/cch9d.html
  2. ^ William Raborn's Multibillion-Dollar Gamble, Reader's Digest, February 1961

Worst CIA Director?[edit]

Does anyone know why William Francis Raborn is regarded as one of the worst directors of the C.I.A.? It's quite a powerful statement to say so and not back it up with a reason as to why.

..I have not found a good answer to this question, but so much is still locked in classified documents. Interesting, however, is what President John said of Raborn's work during the swearing-in ceremony of his replacement, Mr. Richard M. Helms as DCI, 30 June 1966:[1]..

"YOUR COUNTRYMEN . . . cannot know of your accomplishments in the equally crucial business of the Central Intelligence Agency. For it is the lot of those in our intelligence agencies that they should work in silence--sometimes fail in silence, but more often succeed in silence. "Unhappily, also, it is sometimes their lot that they must suffer in silence. For, like all in high public position, they are occasionally subject to criticism, which they must not answer."

Tvbanfield (talk) 16:17, 4 March 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Secondary literature?[edit]

Come on, what the heck is "secondary literature" without a source?