Talk:Internal Revenue Code/Archive 1

Archive 1

Insertion of false quotation from statute

On 3 April 2006, an anonymous user at IP 24.126.162.99 inserted extraneous material (consisting of "quotes" from 26 U.S.C. § 3401) into the article on the Internal Revenue Code. This attempt consisted of three edits, including an attempt to falsify the text of subsection (c) of section 3401 by removing the word "includes" and inserting, in lieu thereof, the word "means."

The user apparently was aware that the word "means" as used in the Internal Revenue Code has a quite different meaning from the word "includes" -- and the difference can be very significant.

The attempt was quite blatant, as the user first inserted subsection (c) with the correct word "includes" and then made a separate edit to change the word to "means."

Even had the anonymous user not falsified the quote, I argue that his or her edits were not appropriate in the article on the Internal Revenue Code. Section 3401 is just one of many provisions of this massive Code, and is no more "significant" for inclusion in this particular article than all the other provisions of the Code. Yours, Famspear 19:43, 3 April 2006 (UTC)

Post-script: The falsification occurred at the edit by IP 24.126.162.99 on 3 April 2006 at 12:14. Yours, Famspear 19:45, 3 April 2006 (UTC)

Post-post script: For those not familiar with the arguments of tax protesters and the apparent reason for the attempt at falsification of the text, one of the frivolous arguments that some of them push is that the Federal income tax applies only to U.S. government employees, or that the tax applies only in the District of Columbia. Some of these individuals, relatedly, argue that the requirement of section 3401 for withholding of taxes applies only to government employees.

The actual text of section 3401(c) is as follows:

(c) Employee

For purposes of this chapter, the term "employee" includes an officer, employee, or elected official of the United States, a State, or any political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing. The term "employee" also includes an officer of a corporation.

Some tax protesters erroneously argue that this statute somehow means that only an officer, employee, or elected official of the United States, etc., etc., can be an "employee." Unfortunately for the tax protesters, the key word in the statute is "includes." Just as unfortunately for tax protesters, 26 U.S.C. § 7701(c) provides:

(c) Includes and including

The terms "includes" and "including" when used in a definition contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined.

In other words, when the words "includes" and "including" are used in the Code, the list that follows those words is not necessarily a complete list -- indeed the Congress uses the word "includes" instead of "means" to make clear to legal scholars that it's not a complete list. The people who draft the statutes do, as a general rule, know what they want to say and how they want to say it (not that they don't occasionally make drafting errors!).

The anonymous user apparently was trying to use Wikipedia to get around all this by simply falsifying the quotation from section 3401(c). If the word in subsection (c) were "means" instead of "includes," then under ordinary rules of statutory construction the words "officer, employee, or elected official of the United States, a State, or any political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing" and the words "officer of a corporation" could be construed to be an exhaustive, complete definition -- thus excluding most people from withholding requirements. Of course, inserting false quotes in an encyclopedia is childish; it does not change the law.

Notice that even if the word in section 3401(c) were "means" instead of "includes," the withholding provisions would still apply to officers of a corporation as well.

More significantly, section 3401 is only a withholding statute. The actual individual income tax liability is imposed at 26 U.S.C. § 1! Yours, Famspear 20:21, 3 April 2006 (UTC)

sounds like a fan of expressio unius other than clarence tomass is behind these fathum quotes. John wesley 20:43, 3 April 2006 (UTC)

Materials inserted on 6 April 2006 by anonymous user at IP 64.173.197.66

"Includes" as found in Law Dictionaries and Supreme Court Rulings:

"Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius. The inclusion of one is the exclusion of another. The certain designation of one person is an absolute exclusion of all others...this doctrine decrees that where law expresly describes [a] particular situation to which it shall apply, an irrefutable inference must be drawn that what is omitted or excluded was intended to be omitted or excluded." Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition

Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, at 153 (1917). "In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes, it is the established rule not to extend their provisions by implication beyond the clear import of the language used, or to enlarge their operations so as to embrace matters not specifically pointed out. In case of doubt they are construed most strongly against the government and in favor of the citizen."

Editor's note: The actual holding of Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917), was that under the Revenue Act of 1913, Congress did not intend that alimony would be included in the income of the recipient for Federal income tax purposes. The effect of the holding of Gould v. Gould was effectively overruled by subsequent legislation. Under current law -- Internal Revenue Code section 71 -- alimony is taxable to the recipient. Yours Famspear 02:25, 8 May 2006 (UTC)

Treasury Decision 3980, Vol. 29, January-December, 1927, pgs. 64 and 65 defines the words includes and including as:

"(1) To comprise, comprehend, or embrace...(2) To enclose within; contain; confine...But granting that the word 'including' is a term of enlargement, it is clear that it only performs that office by introducing the specific elements constituting the enlargement. It thus, and thus only, enlarges the otherwise more limited, preceding general language...The word 'including' is obviously used in the sense of its synonyms, comprising; comprehending; embracing."

Federal Tax Research: Guide to Materials and Techniques, Copyright 1990, Fifth Edition, Gail Levin Richmond, ISBN 1-56662-457-6: Rules of Statutory Construction for tax laws: "expressio unius, exclusio alterius": if one or more items is specifically listed, omitted items are purposely excluded. See Becker v. United States, 451 U.S. 1306 (1981) ...................................

The point of citing the above legal references is to show the restrictions in terms and words defined by the IRS when the IRS uses the words "includes" or "including." Here is what the IRS says about using the words "includes" or "including" in a definition:

TITLE 26, Subtitle F, CHAPTER 79, Sec. 7701C "Includes and including: The terms 'includes' and 'including' when used in a definition contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined."

If 7701C was actually meant to enhance clarity of definitions and terms then it would have been worded in a straightforward and clear manner, such as:

The terms "'includes"' and "'including"' when used in a definition contained in this title shall be construed as expanding the class represented by the common meaning of the word defined with the addition of the explicitly listed items."

I would like to point out that if the word or term being made into a legal term is meant to be understood as having its common meaning, there is no need to define it at all. It is axiomatic that if a word is explicitly defined it has a restricted meaning. Otherwise we would see wording such as, "The terms 'includes' and 'including' when used in a definition contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise with the common meaning of the term defined."

Or we would see, "The term 'employee' includes, in addition to the commonly understood meaning of the term..."

But, the IRS is attempting to imply a definition in the case of the word "employee" that is not shown or stated anywhere in Title 26. And as the above cited legal references make evident, you cannot imply a definition or meaning when specific people, groups or catagories are also shown. This isn't done in the legal or tax world. Once a tax word or term names or lists specific people, groups or catagories, then it is clearly understood that all others are excluded. Here is the definition of "employee" as given by the IRS:26 CFR §31.3401(c )-1 Employee:

"For purposes of this chapter, the term 'employee' includes an officer, employee, or elected official of the United States, a State, or any political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing. The term 'employee' also includes an officer of a corporation."

As the Treasury definition above states, "includes" might be interpreted as an enlargement if it precedes the definition with "specific elements constituting the enlargement." In other words, "employee" must have a prior definition upon which it is enlarging. And that prior definition must be more limited. And it must be shown. Otherwise, "includes" and "including" act to narrow and restrict the term or word.

Upon what prior, more limiting definition of "employee" in Title 26 and IRC 26 was the IRS attempting to enlarge?

And why was there even a need to show that federal government employees were considered employees under the federal income tax law and code? Because they have always been the prime subject of the federal tax laws since the Income Tax Act of 1862 and every attempt to expand that definition to the private sector has been struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court... including the 16th Amendment.

The IRS recognizes this in the Preface of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code, which states:

"The whole body of Internal Revenue laws in effect January 2, 1939, therefore, has its ultimate origin in 164 separate enactments of Congress. The earliest of these was approved July 1, 1862..."

1862. 37th Congress 2nd Session (12 Stat. 432, Chap 119, Sec. 86, p. 472) "And be it further enacted, that on and after the first day of August, 1862, there shall be levied, collected and paid on all salaries of officers, or payments to persons in the civil, military, naval, or other employment or service of the United States, including senators and representatives and delegates in Congress..."

The law taxed only federal government employees and only those within the definition of the "United States." That was the original intent and purpose of the federal tax laws and codes. This is precisely why the definition of "employee" as defined in 3401C is expressed like it is. It is limited to federal government employees in order to comply with the U.S. Supreme Court rulings, which I will give later.

The scope and legal application of the federal income tax laws and codes is further limited by the IRS definition of "United States." Under Title 26 let's see what the official IRS definition os "United States" is:

TITLE 26 , Subtitle F , CHAPTER 79 , Sec. 7701. [Internal Revenue Code] Sec. 7701. - Definitions (a)(9) United States The term "United States" when used in a geographical sense includes only the States and the District of Columbia.

And...

TITLE 26 , Subtitle C , CHAPTER 21 , Subchapter C , Sec. 3121. [Employment Taxes: FICA] Sec. 3121. - Definitions (e) State, United States, and citizen For purposes of this chapter [Chapter 21]- (1) State The term "State" includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa. (2) United States The term "United States" when used in a geographical sense includes the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa.

Note that the above definition does not use the term "50 states." The term "includes" is limiting the definition to the territories of the United States, which, in turn, is limiting the definition of "United States." As clear evidence of the IRS intent to define "state" as including ONLY territories, and not any of the 50 states, we can follow their refinement of the term state as Hawaii and Alaska were added as states.

1939 Code [Sec. 3797 (a) (10)] (When Alaska and Hawaii were both Territories) "State"--The term "State" shall be construed to include the Territories and the District of Columbia, where such construction is necessary to carry out the provisions of this title."

1954 Code (When Alaska became one of the 49 states and Hawaii is the only Territory) "Amended 1954 Sec. 7701(a) (10) by striking out "Territories" and substituting "Territory of Hawaii." "State[26USC 7701(a) (10) "The term State shall be construed to include the Territory of Hawaii and the District of Columbia..."

On August 21, 1959, when Hawaii became a state, the definition of "State" was amended as follows: "State"--"The term State shall be construed to include the District of Columbia..." Note the exclusion of the Territory of Hawaii which has now moved into the classification of the "50 states."

Clearly we see the IRS amending the definition of "State" to make sure it ONLY includes Territories. Once a Territory becomes a state, it is taken out of the definition of "State."

So we now have the current definition of United States as shown above in 7701 as "including only the States and the District of Columbia." And in 3121 we see the term "state" listing ONLY the Territories and the District of Columbia, and not referring to the "50 States" and the term "United States" also listing ONLY Territories.

Now compare the above limiting definition of "United States" with another definition of "United States" given elsewhere within Title 26:

TITLE 26 , Subtitle D , CHAPTER 38 , Subchapter A , Sec. 4612. [Environmental Taxes: Taxes on Petroleum] Sec. 4612. - Definitions and special rules (a) Definitions For purposes of this subchapter [subchapter A]- (4) United States (A) In general The term "United States" means the 50 States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, any possession of the United States, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. (B) United States includes continental shelf areas The principles of section 638 shall apply for purposes of the term "United States". (C) United States includes foreign trade zones The term "United States" includes any foreign trade zone of the United States. .......................................

Of course the above definition has application only to corporate income taxes and not to personal income taxes as evidenced by the qualifying wording "For the purposes of this subchapter." If they had wanted the above definition to apply to personal income taxes it would have been shown in the chapter dealing exclusively with personal income taxes, but, instead it is given ONLY in the chapter dealing only to corporate income taxes and making it clear that the definition has application ONLY to that particular subchapter. The IRS's taxing authority is much broader in the corporate realm.

So, if the IRS wants to define United States as including the 50 states, it does so and does it very clearly. Note that they did not use the term "includes" in the above definition either. They were very clear and direct with the word "means."

The IRS Codes have been amended hundreds of times since 1939 often with the intent to clarify meaning and not once has Congress nor the IRS amended the definitions of "United States" or "State" as now shown in 7701 and 3121 to clarify that it means the 48 or 49 or 50 states. And there have been many challenges to these definitions yet Congress and the IRS have let the definitions stand as is. This is because the clear legal intent of the definitions of "United States" and "State", for personal income tax purposes, was and is to limit their scope and meaning to the District of Columbia and U.S. Possessions. If it had been otherwise, Congress and the IRS would have long ago amended these codes to clarify the meaning beyond any doubt.

The reason why Congressional and IRS taxing authority on personal income is limited to federal government employees within the District of Columbia and U.S. Territories is because that is where Congress has the power "To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever..." Article 1, Sec. 8, Clause 17. Also see Article IV, Sec. 3, Clause 2.

"In exercising its constitutional power to make all needful regulations respecting territory belonging to the United States, Congress is not subject to the same constitutional limitations as when it is legislating for the United States[the 50 states]." Hooven v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 674

"Constitutional restrictions and limitations were NOT applicable to the areas of land, enclaves, territories and possessions over which Congress had exclusive legislative authority." Downs v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244

This unsigned comment was added on 6 April 2006 by 64.173.197.66 (talk • contribs) .

Commentary on text dump

Note to fellow editors: Good grief! The text dump above by an anonymous user at IP 64.173.197.66 apparently was copied and pasted into Wikipedia from:

http://solariactionnetwork.com/phpBB2/viewtopic.php?t=1437&sid=7df8c32c701ac3f32f723af93d2da7c3 which in turn apparently dates back to 30 September 2004.

This is tax protester rhetoric and contains the usual false statements and other inaccuracies. For example, see the statement:

of course the above definition has application only to corporate income taxes and not to personal income taxes as evidenced by the qualifying wording "For the purposes of this subchapter."

The reference to the "above definition" is a reference to Internal Revenue Code section 4612 which relates to neither corporate income taxes nor personal income taxes. Section 4612 relates to certain excise taxes imposed on the receipt of crude oil at certain oil refineries and on the entry of certain petroleum products into the United States for consumption, use or warehousing, and certain other petroleum-related taxes.

There are also phony interpretations of the terms "includes" and "including," as well as phony interpretations of the term "United States." See Internal Revenue Code section 7701(a).

By the way, do we have a copyright problem here? Yours, Famspear 17:59, 7 April 2006 (UTC)

Oh, another thing: Let's look again at the following rhetoric from the aforementioned text dump:

Codes have been amended hundreds of times since 1939 often with the intent to clarify meaning and not once has Congress nor the IRS amended the definitions of "United States" or "State" as now shown in 7701 and 3121 to clarify that it means the 48 or 49 or 50 states. And there have been many challenges to these definitions yet Congress and the IRS have let the definitions stand as is. This is because the clear legal intent of the definitions of "United States" and "State", for personal income tax purposes, was and is to limit their scope and meaning to the District of Columbia and U.S. Possessions. If it had been otherwise, Congress and the IRS would have long ago amended these codes to clarify the meaning beyond any doubt.

The reason why Congressional and IRS taxing authority on personal income is limited to federal government employees within the District of Columbia and U.S. Territories is because that is where Congress has the power "To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever..." Article 1, Sec. 8, Clause 17. Also see Article IV, Sec. 3, Clause 2.

This rhetoric is FALSE. Indeed, no court has ever ruled in favor of the argument that, for Federal income tax purposes, the terms "United States" and "State" mean only the District of Columbia and U.S. Possessions. And Congress has has plenty of opportunity to reverse the courts' interpretations that the income tax laws apply in all fifty states, and yet the Congress has never done so. Had Congress or the IRS thought the courts were "wrong," Congress "would have long ago amended these codes to clarify the meaning beyond any doubt" to use the language of the text dump above. Yours, Famspear 20:28, 7 April 2006 (UTC)

Now let's look at the following language from the text dump:

the IRS is attempting to imply a definition in the case of the word "employee" that is not shown or stated anywhere in Title 26. And as the above cited legal references make evident, you cannot imply a definition or meaning when specific people, groups or catagories are also shown. This isn't done in the legal or tax world. Once a tax word or term names or lists specific people, groups or catagories, then it is clearly understood that all others are excluded.

The above quoted passage is not only Not Verifiable, it is demonstrably false. This frivolous argument was made by the taxpayer in United States v. Latham. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected the argument and stated:

[The taxpayer's contention] that under 26 U. S. C. §3401(c) the category of "employee" does not include privately employed wage earners is a preposterous reading of the statute. It is obvious that within the context of both statutes the word "includes" is a term of enlargement not of limitation, and the reference to certain entities or categories is not intended to exclude all others.

United States v. Latham, 754 F.2d 747, 85-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragr. 9180 (7th Cir. 1985) (bolding added).

Another taxpayer in Sullivan v. United States tried to make the same argument. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected that argument, stating:

To the extent Sullivan argues that he received no "wages" in 1983 because he was not an "employee" within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. §3401(c), that contention is meritless. Section 3401(c) , which relates to income tax withholding, indicates that the definition of "employee" includes government officers and employees, elected officials, and corporate officers. The statute does not purport to limit withholding to the persons listed therein.

Sullivan v. United States, 788 F.2d 813, 86-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragr. 9343 (1st Cir. 1986) (bolding added).

Have a nice day. Yours, Famspear 01:32, 8 April 2006 (UTC)

Question

Which "officers of a corporation" are liable? What qualities make them so special that they are specifically mentioned in the Code? Where in the Code is the list that specifies each corporate office holder with the liability? The Wiki article on "Corporate officer" has a long list, but many were invented after the Code was written. Any ideas from the experts here? Thanks!

[Note: The above question was posted by an anon user at IP 63.173.197.166 on 6 April 2006]

Internal Revenue Code as "positive law"

To clear up some possible misconception that may have been the motivation for an edit to this article: The Internal Revenue Code (IRC) of 1954 was enacted by Congress as "positive law." Like its predecessor (the IRC of 1939), the '54 Code was also designated as "title 26" of the United States Code. (Also, in 1986 the name of the '54 code was changed to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.) It is arguably technically correct to say that title 26 of the United States Code, as amended from time to time, is "non-positive" law. The distinction between positive law and non-positive law is a fine technical distinction which has little practical legal significance. Famspear 02:51, 7 April 2006 (UTC)

Bear in mind, the law is what the Supreme Court says it is. Portions of the Tax Code and lower court decisions fall when the Supreme Court makes a ruling. I notice there isn't much argument about "include", because the Supreme Court has made several pointed rulings on that specific term. Bottom line is, the law is not enforced as it is written.

This unsigned comment was added on 7 April 2006 by 64.173.197.66 (talk • contribs) .

It is certainly correct to say that the law is what the Supreme Court says it is. Unfortunately for tax protesters, this rule works against them. The terms "includes" and "including" mean exactly what section 7701(c) says they mean. And neither the United States Supreme Court nor any other Federal court has ever ruled that those terms mean what the tax protesters wish the words meant. Tax protesters can whistle past the graveyard all they want and argue until they are blue in their collective, aggregative faces. They can re-print and regurgitate and recopy and repaste all the phony idiosyncratic interpretations from tax protester web sites all they want, but that doesn't change the fact that no court has ever ruled that the Federal income taxes imposed by the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 are invalid in any way. Bottom line is: the Federal income tax law in the United States is, by definition, being enforced as it is written. And Wikipedia has rules regarding Verifiability and Neutral Point of View. Wikipedia is not a soapboax. Wikipedia is an encyclopedia. Sorry. Famspear 19:12, 7 April 2006 (UTC)

I concur with Famspear. It is positive law, like it or not. It's not up to WIkipedia to argue the applicability of the law.—Markles 20:13, 7 April 2006 (UTC)

Were we to bring Austin back from the beyond, I bet he would hold that the IRC is positive law very much as the 1954 Code as YY Stat. ppp. 20:18, 7 April 2006 (UTC) John wesley 20:19, 7 April 2006 (UTC)

IRS is Based in Puerto Rico

Note: the following text dump of tax protester rhetoric by an anonymous user at IP 63.173.197.66 was apparently copied and pasted on 28 April 2006 from other places on the internet, possibly from [1], and is a possible copyright violation. I have added my own interlineated comments. Yours, Famspear 22:25, 28 April 2006 (UTC)

The Internal Revenue Service is not an agency of the United States government. It is true that not only can it NOT be found in Title 31, but it is nowhere to be found in the entirety of Title 5 U.S.C. [Editor's note: This is false. The Internal Revenue Service is a bureau within the U.S. Department of the Treasury. The "Internal Revenue Service" is specifically mentioned in at least ten places in Title 5 and at least three places in Title 31 of the U.S. Code. The "Internal Revenue Service" is also specifically mentioned in over ninety places in the Internal Revenue Code (Title 26 of the U.S. Code). Yours, Famspear 21:51, 28 April 2006 (UTC)]

Congress THOUGHT it created it but it didn't. Just look at the 1100 manual and it tells you so. [Editor's note: For these purposes, there is no such thing as an "1100 manual." There is a manual for IRS employees called the "Internal Revenue Manual (IRM)." Nothing in the IRM says that Congress "thought" it created the IRS. Yours, Famspear 21:51, 28 April 2006 (UTC)] Congress only created the Commissioner's Office. [Editor's note: This statement is actually correct! Congress created the Commissioner's office, but not the IRS itself. However, the IRS is a bureau within the U.S. Department of the Treasury. Under U.S. law, there is no requirement that a bureau within the U.S. Department of the Treasury be "created" by Congress in order to be a government agency. Yours, Famspear 21:51, 28 April 2006 (UTC)] He then hired the private collection agency people and used them as the tax collectors. [Editor's note: This statement is not only unverified, it is false. Yours, Famspear 21:51, 28 April 2006 (UTC)] In fact, I defy you to find any IRS employee listed as an Employee of the United States Government with a United States Employee Identification number that has been hired by any District Director in the country. [Editor's note: This statement is legally meaningless. IRS employees are issued IRS employee numbers, and are required to disclose employee numbers during conversations with taxpayers and their representatives. Anyone who deals with the IRS by phone, for example, is well aware of this. Yours, Famspear 21:51, 28 April 2006 (UTC)] Now I suggest you look at 27 Code of Federal Regulations Section 250.11 and therein you will find the definition of "Revenue agent." That definition reads "Any duly authorized Commonwealth Internal Revenue Agent of the Department of the Treasury of Puerto Rico." [Editor's note: This verbiage is gibberish. Nothing in Title 27 of the Code of Federal Regulations or in any other Federal regulation says that a "Revenue agent," as an IRS employee, is really only an agent of the "Department of the Treasury of Puerto Rico." Sorry. Yours, Famspear 21:51, 28 April 2006 (UTC)]

I now refer you to the "Secretary" described in 26 U.S.C. 6301. Does it not state, "The Secretary shall collect the taxes imposed by the internal revenue laws?" Yes it does. Now Congress mandated this by 68A Stat 775 and you cannot disagree. Does not 26 U.S.C. state that this "Secretary" may make a return based on the information he has if a person does not make a return? Yes it does. Does not 26 U.S.C. 6001, 6011 and 6012 refer to this "Secretary?" Yes it does. [Editor's note: This verbiage is basically correct! Yours, Famspear 21:51, 28 April 2006 (UTC)]

Now, if the Revenue agent decides to prosecute, he approaches the Attorney General and this "Secretary" as noted in 26 USC 7401 to prosecute upon concurrence between both the Attorney General and this "Secretary," is this not correct? Yes it is and all the above is undisputable. [Editor's note: Regarding the beginning of this paragraph, so far so good! Yours, Famspear 21:51, 28 April 2006 (UTC)] Is it now contrary to any rational man that this "Secretary" can only be one person and not many. [Editor's note: Incorrect! Internal Revenue Code section 7701(a)(11) specifically provides that the term "Secretary," when used this way in the Internal Revenue Code, means Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate," and section 7701(a)(12) specifically provides that "or his delegate" means any officer, employee, or agency of the Treasury Department duly authorized," etc., etc. Sorry! Yours, Famspear 21:51, 28 April 2006 (UTC)]

Now, I direct your attention to 27 CFR 250.11 again for the definition of "Secretary" as found in all the above. The defining term for "Secretary" is, "The Secretary of the Treasury of Puerto Rico." That man is Manual Diaz Saldana. Those revenue agents operating in all the states are not United States employees. The Statute mandated to be at the end of each regulation by 1 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) is 68A State 775 (26 USC 6301). [Editor's note: Wrong citation again! Sorry. "27 CFR 250.11" has nothing to do with the fact that the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury has legally empowered an agency of the Department of the Treasury, the Internal Revenue Service, to administer the internal revenue laws. And the term "Secretary" is nowhere defined in title 26 (again, that's title twenty-six, not twenty-seven) of the United States Code (title 26 being the Internal Revenue Code) or Title 26 (not Title 27!) the Code of Federal Regulations as being the Secretary of the Treasury of Puerto Rico! What a laugh! Yours, Famspear 21:51, 28 April 2006 (UTC)]

I now direct your attention to the House of Representatives, 39th Congress, 2nd Session, Ex. Doc. 99, titled Salary Tax Upon Clerks to Postmasters, LETTER from THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY dated Feb. 20, 1867, referred to the House Ways and Means committee and ordered to be printed. I am now going to prove that the IRS agents are not now nor were they ever employees of the United States. You can obtain the document faster than the man on the street. The postmaster wanted to know why postal clerks had to pay income taxes and why the IRS clerks did not have to. The "clerks" are today called "revenue agents." I quote part of the response that is not taken out of context concerning the IRS employees. Why should I, because it is verifiable by anyone. [Editor's note: Good grief. a letter from the Secretary of the Treasury in 1867 regarding what??? What a joke. Let's move on. Yours, Famspear 21:51, 28 April 2006 (UTC)]

"No money is advanced by the United States for the payment of such salaries, nor do the assessors perform the duties of disbursing agents of the United States in paying their clerks. The entire amount allowed is paid directly to the assessor, and he is not accountable to the United States for its payment to his clerks, for the reason he has paid them in advance, out of his own funds, and this is reimbursement to him of such amount as the department decides to be reasonable. No salary tax is therefore collected, or required by the Treasury Department to be accounted for, or paid, on account of payments to assessors' clerks, as the United States pays no such clerks nor has them in its employ or service, and they do not come within the provisions of existing laws imposing such a tax." This was signed by H. McCULLOCH Secretary of the Treasury. [Editor's note: OK, we're pretty much in in la-la land now. Let's keep moving! Yours, Famspear 21:51, 28 April 2006 (UTC)]

Then to clarify it he included Section 165 which states that the only people to pay income taxes are, and I quote ". . persons in the civil, military, naval, or other employment service of the United States, including senators and representatives and delegates in Congress,. . . "

Since the postal clerks are paid by the United States and the IRS agents were not, those revenue agents were just like me and the millions that do not work or contract with the United States. Therefore they were not subject to the income tax. And so it is today, and that explains why the private collection agency agents cannot be sued under 26 USC 7214 because they are not employee's of the United States. Today they are based out of and under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury of Puerto Rico, strictly to collect alcohol, tobacco, and firearms taxable activities. [Editor's note: Yes, I'm still here, but it's hard not to giggle at this point. So this is what passes for "legal analysis"? Let's keep moving! Yours, Famspear 21:51, 28 April 2006 (UTC)]

The identity of the Secretary is not found in title 26 U.S.C.. The only reference to the identity of the Secretary of the Treasury is in 27 C.F.R. at section 250.11 (definitions) which specifically states: "Secretary means Secretary of the Treasury of Puerto Rico". [Editor's note: Umm, I think we've been here already. Keep moving! Yours, Famspear 21:51, 28 April 2006 (UTC)]

Departamento De Hacienda Secretary of the Treasury Manuel Diaz Saldana P.O. Box 4515 San Juan, Puerto Rico, 00902 1-787-721-2020

He's the head honcho. Also, you are usually dealing with an agent with a title of "Revenue Agent." The only definition of revenue agent is in 27 C.F.R.section 250.11 and is defined as: "Revenue Agent means any duly authorized Commonwealth Internal Revenue Agent of the Department of the Treasury of Puerto Rico." [Editor's note: Wow, thanks for clearing that up. Keep moving! Yours, Famspear 21:51, 28 April 2006 (UTC)]

WHERE DOES YOUR TAX MONEY GO?

When you send money to the IRS it first goes to a Federal Reserve Bank which is a quasi- government owned bank.

From there it goes into the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development into what they call a Quad Zero account with a drawback fund from which the IRS refunds are distributed. (Title 22 section 286 United States Code) (31 CFR chapter 11, section 214.7)

What is left is then transferred to the International Monetary Fund (United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, July 22, 1944) This money is then loaned out to other countries around the world including the United States. They must then pay back these loans (with interest) to the Central Bankers, not the united States of America.

['Editor's note: OK, that's it, finally. The above text dump by an anonymous user at IP 63.173.197.66 -- to which I subsequently added my own interlineated comments -- is a typical example of what passes for "analysis" of tax laws in the eyes of certain people who do not observe Wikipedia's rules including but not limited to the rules on copyright violation, Verifiability, and Neutral Point of View. Wikipedia is not a cyberspace soapbox. Let's observe the rules of Wikipedia. Wikipedia is an encyclopedia. Yours, Famspear 22:09, 28 April 2006 (UTC)]

Note: the preceding text dump of tax protester rhetoric by an anonymous user at IP 63.173.197.66 was apparently copied and pasted on 28 April 2006 from other places on the internet, possibly from [2], and is a possible copyright violation

Dear fellow Wikipedia editors: The user or users at IP 63.173.197.66 have engaged in repeated text dumps of tax protester rhetoric over the past few weeks. For more information, see the user's talk page. Yours, Famspear 17:27, 28 April 2006 (UTC)

FACTUAL INQUIRY

[Editor's Note: A large portion of the court decisions cited in the May 3, 2006, text dump below have already been cited in text dumps in late 2005, and are already discussed in the Talk (Discussion) pages of Wikipedia. The anonymous text dumper's comments to the contrary notwithstanding, there may or may not be a copyright concern with respect to this text dump. Regarding the court decisions, these are the same court decisions cited over and over by tax protesters as somehow standing for various arguments that the Federal income tax is unconstitutional, invalid, etc., or that it is "misapplied" or somehow applies only to "corporate profits," etc., etc. Unfortunately, as already discussed in the Wikipedia talk pages, none of the courts in any of these cases have ever so ruled. In fact, the cited cases and all other cases decided since 1913, the year of advent of the modern income tax, say exactly the opposite of what the tax protesters say these cases say. Stay tuned. Yours, Famspear 18:04, 3 May 2006 (UTC)]

—The following unsigned text dump was added by 64.173.197.166 (talk • contribs) on 3 May 2006.

This area of the Wiki is for discussion. The main article on this Wiki topic has not been altered. Famspear is the resident uberGeek for the Internal Revenue Code. This contemporary court filing is not a copyright infringement, it is a Copyleft publication. When/if information herein is proved true, it will be moved to the article section of this topic.

Overriding Fact: The Supreme Court is the arbiter of what is law. Every citation herein is from the Supremes. None have been overturned. Famspear is welcome to critique this information.

Editor's note: No, sorry, not every citation herein is from "the Supremes" (the U.S. Supreme Court). And yes, some of these cases have been "overturned." Overriding fact: None of the cases or other materials cited below stand for the silly proposition that the Federal income tax imposed under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is unconstitutional or "misapplied," etc., etc. See comments below. Have a nice day! Yours, Famspear 23:19, 3 May 2006 (UTC)

Editor's note: As of 7 May 2006, the following cases cited in this text dump have been identified as having been overruled or effectively overruled (either by statutory change, constitutional amendment, or subsequent Supreme Court decision): Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895); Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917); Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920). See the discussion accompanying references to each case. Yours, Famspear 02:32, 8 May 2006 (UTC)

>>>>>>>>>>>>

Now Comes Charles F. Conces, by Special Appearance, presenting this FACTUAL INQUIRY, to this Honorable Court, as Pro-se and as a researcher, and also in any matter concerning the Lawman Public Interest Groups:

Note: Charles F. Conces is a Pro-se litigant and is entitled to considerations under the rulings in Haines vs. Kerner and CIA vs. Plasky.

This Factual Inquiry on material matters is done to establish the truth concerning certain facts and issues in this case. The Inquiry is prompted by the many false allegations presented in Judge Gordon Quist’s Order and Opinion of April 24, 2006 and by earlier Opinions. The Inquiry is directed at both Judge Gordon Quist and the DOJ attorneys who appear to be unaware of the U.S. Supreme Court’s precedence law rulings on the income tax and its effects, as stated in the research report by Charles F. Conces, which is work done over the last 7 years by Mr. Conces and other people.

Charles F. Conces, hereby presents this inquiry in order to make certain determinations on issues of fraud that have arisen in this case and to determine if there are false assumptions being made by Judge Gordon Quist and the DOJ attorneys, Michael Raum and Thomas W. Curteman, Jr., that are in conflict with precedence law, statutory law and/or codified law.

Charles Conces has previously asked for the Statute At Large, Code Section, and/or Implementing Regulation that authorizes an income tax on every private citizen. Conces also asked for the identification, by code section or other means, of the agents that were allegedly “interfered with”. Judge Quist and the DOJ attorneys have refused to give a responsive answer, and thus have violated their fiduciary responsibilities and committed fraud as per McNally v. U.S., 483 U.S. 350, 371-372 (1987), Quoting U.S. v Holzer, 816 F.2d. 304, 307. See below number 3 of the Inquiry. The Inquiry below is to establish the proof of Conces’ claims and to make such evidence available to the general public.

Conces also needs this information to establish on the record what appeal issues need to be addressed, as Conces will most likely find that an appeal is necessary if Judge Quist does not dismiss this case. Conces may also request cert.

Judge Gordon J. Quist, Michael Raum, and Thomas Curteman shall be referred to as the respondents in this Inquiry. Each individual shall file his own response.

Charles f. Conces admonishes the DOJ attorneys not to have ex-parte communications with Judge Quist on this matter.

Editor's note: Before we go any further, readers should know that this text dump includes a lot more of this verbiage purporting to be by or in connection with one "Charles F. Conces." The following is the text of a news release from the United States Department of Justice (DOJ), dated April 25, 2006, and found at the DOJ web site at: [3]

COURT ORDERS MICHIGAN MAN TO HALT TAX-FRAUD SCHEME AND STOP PREPARING TAX RETURNS FOR OTHERS

WASHINGTON, D.C. - The Justice Department announced today that a federal court in Grand Rapids has permanently barred Charles Conces of Battle Creek, Mich., from preparing federal tax returns for others and promoting several tax-fraud schemes. The civil injunction order, signed by Judge Gordon J. Quist of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan, was entered against Conces and his organization, the National Lawman Committee for the Public Interest.

The court concluded that Conces “promotes tax evasion by creating and selling materials designed to obstruct the administration of the income tax laws.” The court also noted that Conces promotes the use of the so-called “zero return,” described by the court as “a return showing that the taxpayer has no income based upon the faulty premise that income is not taxable under the income tax laws.”

In addition to halting sales of his materials, Conces must also notify his customers of the injunction and give the Justice Department a list of his customers’ names, addresses, phone numbers, e-mail addresses, and Social Security numbers.

The Justice Department has obtained injunctions against more than 175 tax-fraud promoters and tax preparers since 2001. More information about the Justice Department’s efforts against tax-scam promoters can be found at http://www.usdoj.gov/tax/taxpress2006.htm. Information about the Justice Department’s Tax Division can be found at http://www.usdoj.gov/index.html.

That's the end of the Justice Department news release. Now, back to the text dump.... Yours, Famspear 21:30, 5 May 2006 (UTC)

>>

—The following unsigned comment was added by 64.173.197.166 (talk • contribs) on 7 May 2006.

This is a legal case still in progress (circa 07 May 06). Just because the government trumpets a "win" in a press release, doesn't mean the issue has come to a conclusion. Federal judges' opinions are overturned by the appeals court and the supreme court plenty of times. Famspear's inclusion of the above comment is intended to decieve, because he failed to state the legal action is still in progress.

—The preceding unsigned comment was added by 64.173.197.166 (talk • contribs) on 7 May 2006. <<

Dear fellow editors: No, my inclusion of the above comment is not intended to deceive. Not only that, I have no information to the effect that the legal action in this Conces matter is "still in progress." And whether the case is on appeal or not -- whether the matter has been finally decided -- is of no significance until and unless Mr. Conces actually appeals it and an appeals court actually rules in his favor. These events have not happened. Good grief! Cases in which the time for appeal has not elapsed are subject to appeal! I'm sorry, but that doesn't change the fact that the trial court has ruled. There is no requirement that I or anyone else state whether the legal action is "still in progress" on a particular case mentioned in Wikipedia. By the way, a trial court decision on the merits is referred to in law as a "final judgment" -- whether appealed or not, and whether later reversed or not.

I would argue, however, that there is some obligation to Wikipedia readers to point out the fact that you are citing to court decisions that were overruled many years ago. There are sometimes valid reasons to cite decisions that have been reversed or overruled, but you should at least disclose that status! I am not the one who falsely stated -- as the user at IP 64.173.197.166 did -- that none of the cases he/she cited had been overturned! Again, the Conces case is "still in progress" only if Mr. Conces actually appeals -- and the anonymous editor at IP 64.173.197.166 has not shown that any such appeal is being undertaken! I am not the one who dumped -- as IP 64.173.197.166 did -- the original, non-neutral POV text shown both above and below into this Talk page. I am not the one who falsely stated -- as 64.173.197.166 did -- that all the cases cited in the text dump were from the "Supremes" (the U.S. Supreme Court).

I am not the one who conveniently failed to mention -- as IP 64.173.197.166 conveniently failed to mention -- the legal history of Mr. Conces. I am the editor who exposed that history, and who is now being attacked for making that exposure, and who has been exposing the falsehoods by the editor at IP 64.173.197.166. Have a nice day. Yours, Famspear 19:42, 7 May 2006 (UTC)

Inquiry Does each respondent consider himself a competent individual, capable of carrying out his duties of Office? Yes/No. Is each respondent capable to carry out his official duties, and not impaired by use of drugs, alcohol, or any other disability? Yes/No. Is each respondent aware that he is a fiduciary to the public as stated in the following case? Yes/ No. McNally v. U.S., 483 U.S. 350, 371-372 (1987), Quoting U.S. v Holzer, 816 F.2d. 304, 307: “"Fraud in its elementary common law sense of deceit - and this is one of the meanings that fraud bears in the statute, see United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163, 168 (7th Cir. 1985) - includes the deliberate concealment of material information in a setting of fiduciary obligation. A public official is a fiduciary toward the public, including, in the case of a judge, the litigants who appear before him, and if he deliberately conceals material information from them he is guilty of fraud. When a judge is busily soliciting loans from counsel to one party, and not telling the opposing counsel (let alone the public), he is concealing material information in violation of his fiduciary obligations.”

Is each respondent aware that he is obligated by law to make known material information to Charles F. Conces and the general public when asked? Yes/ No.

Editor's note: Wow, this reminds us of a common thread among many tax protesters: the idea that other people (especially government personnel) are somehow obligated to "just show us the law that makes us liable for a tax." The question above -- posed almost rhetorically, it would appear -- seems to imply that the person posing the question believes that each "respondent" in the referenced case "is obligated by law to make known material information to Charles F. Conces and the general public when asked".

Now, the verbiage above does not specifically say "show me the law" -- but the shrill tenor of "show me the law" and the shrill tenor of -- I'm paraphrasing here -- "respondent is obligated by law to make known material information to Charles F. Conces and the general public when asked" are at least arguably related.

Hey, tax protesters! Wake up! This may be shocking, but you'll have to learn this sooner or later: There is, as a general proposition of law, no obligation imposed by law to make known material information to Charles F. Conces and the general public when asked.

Yes, the government does publish the actual texts of statutes, treaties, regulations, executive orders, court rules, court decisions, etc., etc., etc. Yes, various government agencies do publish forms and instructions and guidelines and other materials in connection with the administration and enforcement of the law. And yes, there are, in certain specific circumstances, specific obligations imposed on specific government employees with respect to disclosure of specific things.

There is, however, no legal obligation on the part of government employees or anybody else to provide "proof" satisfactory to tax protesters that the U.S. Federal income tax laws are valid and are being properly applied, etc., etc. Similarly, there is no general legal obligation on the part of government employees (or anybody else) to provide "proof" satisfactory to tax protesters (or anybody else) that the laws on contracts, or property, or torts, or the environment, or murder, or theft, or any other areas of law are valid or are being properly "applied."

Many tax protesters claim that they have asked government employees to just "show them the law" that makes them liable for Federal income tax. Whether a particular government employee "shows you the law" (to your own personal satisfaction, or otherwise) has no bearing on whether that law exists or is being legally applied to you. Sorry. Famspear 23:15, 5 May 2006 (UTC)

Is each respondent aware of the U.S. Supreme Court rulings, which have been presented in this case and relied upon by Charles F. Conces. Yes/ No. Is each respondent aware of the issues of fraud that are present in any fiduciary setting? Yes/No. Are respondents aware of the general definition of fraud? Yes/No. Fraud: Deceit, deception, artifice, or trickery operating prejudicially on the rights of another, and so intended, by inducing him to part with property or surrender some legal right. 23 Am J2d Fraud § 2. Anything calculated to deceive another to his prejudice and accomplishing the purpose, whether it be an act, a word, silence, the suppression of the truth, or other device contrary to the plain rules of common honesty. 23 Am J2d Fraud § 2. An affirmation of a fact rather than a promise or statement of intent to do something in the future. Miller v Sutliff, 241 111 521, 89 NE 651.

Has each respondent read and understood the Supreme Court rulings that Charles Conces has raised in his briefs and other filings in this case? Yes/No. Is each respondent aware that lower courts do not have the power to overturn Supreme Court rulings? Yes/ No. Are respondents aware that unpublished decisions may not be used in this case as precedence law or in DOJ briefs? Yes/ No. (a) In light of the following Supreme Court rulings, do respondents agree that there was no new taxing power provided to the federal government by the 16th Amendment? Yes/No. BRUSHABER v UNION PACIFIC R. CO., 240 US 1, 12 (1916):

“… the contentions under it (the 16th Amendment), if acceded to, would cause one provision of the Constitution to destroy another; that is, they would result in bringing the provisions of the Amendment exempting a direct tax from apportionment into irreconcilable conflict with the general requirement that all direct taxes be apportioned. … This result, instead of simplifying the situation and making clear the limitations on the taxing power … would create radical and destructive changes in our constitutional system and multiply confusion.”

Editor's note: Brushaber is getting to be my favorite court decision in the whole wide world. Seriously, folks, see my discussion of the Brushaber decision below. This is the one of the worst cases that a tax protester should be citing! Yours, Famspear 21:49, 5 May 2006 (UTC)

IF THAT IS WHAT YOU REALLY THINK YOU BETTER TAKE A LOOK AT WHAT THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SENT OUT TO THEIR EMPLOYEES BECAUSE OF THE SUPREME COUT RULING IN THE BRUSHABER CASE. THEY CALLED IT, TREASURY DECISION 2313 —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.161.10.114 (talk • contribs)

Dear IP24.161.10.114: No, I do not need to read Treasury Decision 2313 or any other Treasury Decision. Brushaber is a United States Supreme Court decision, and it is a leading case. Famspear (talk) 01:06, 8 April 2009 (UTC)

EVANS v GORE, 253 US 245, 263 (1920):

“Does the Sixteenth Amendment authorize and support this tax and the attendant diminution; that is to say, does it bring within the taxing powers subjects theretofore excepted? The court below answered in the negative; and counsel for the government say: ‘It is not, in view of recent decisions, contended that this amendment rendered anything taxable as income that was not so taxable before’.”

Editor's Note: Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920), was overruled in O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277 (1939), where the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Federal income tax. Not only that, but the quote from Evans is not even part of the holding of the case anyway! Have a nice day! Yours, Famspear 23:11, 3 May 2006 (UTC)

BOWERS v. KERBAUGH-EMPIRE CO., 271 U.S. 170, 174 (1926):

“The Sixteenth Amendment declares that Congress shall have power to levy and collect taxes on income, 'from whatever source derived' without apportionment among the several states, and without regard to any census or enumeration. It was not the purpose or effect of that amendment to bring any new subject within the taxing power.”

(b) Do respondents agree that the above two rulings were made in accordance with the definition of “income” in its constitutional sense? Yes/No.

STANTON v BALTIC MINING CO., 240 US 103, 112-114 (1916):

“Not being within the authority of the 16th Amendment, the tax is therefore, within the ruling of Pollock… a direct tax and void for want of compliance with the regulation of apportionment.”

Editor's note: The above verbiage was inserted by a tax protester to give Wikipedia readers the false impression that this statement was the Court's decision in the Stanton case. Unfortunately, this quote is the argument of the taxpayer in the Stanton case, not the ruling of the Court! The Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled against the taxpayer. Again, the above quote was put here by a tax protester to mislead Wikipedia readers into thinking that the Court ruled the opposite of what it actually ruled. Tax protesters have done this with at least one other leading Supreme Court decision here on the pages of Wikipedia. Many tax protesters do not realize that the tax lawyers have already studied these cases! Yours, Famspear 03:30, 6 May 2006 (UTC)

Editor's note: PS: Every time you see a reference to the Pollock case, remember: The effect of the holding in Pollock (essentially, the rule that income taxes on income from property had to be apportioned to be constitutional) was overruled in 1913 by the Sixteenth Amendment. Yours, Famspear 03:42, 6 May 2006 (UTC)

“…it manifestly disregards the fact that by the previous ruling it was settled that the provisions of the 16th Amendment conferred no new power of taxation..”

Editor's note: This is a quote cited over and over by tax protesters because they do not understand what they are reading. The key language is that the amendment "conferred no new power of taxation" (emphasis added). Congress, under the U.S. Constitution, has always had the power to tax incomes, for example. This was true regardless of the source of the income -- regardless of whether the income tax was a direct tax (in the case on income taxes on income from property, such as dividends, rent, and interest income) or an excise (indirect tax) such as income taxes on wages, on salaries, etc. The only restriction removed by the 16th Amendment was the restriction that direct taxes on income (i.e., income taxes on income from property) be apportioned among the states according to population. Because of the Sixteenth Amendment, the "source" dichotomy -- the direct tax versus excise (indirect tax) dichotomy -- became legally irrelevant.

Because of the Sixteenth Amendment, direct taxes on income (that is, income taxes on income from property) are no longer required to be apportioned among the states according to population.

By contrast, income taxes on wages, salaries, etc., are "excises" (indirect taxes) in the constitutional law sense. They are not now (and have never been) required to be apportioned. Income taxes on wages, salaries, etc., have always been constitutional. This is one of the basic points that tax protesters miss. Read the actual text of the Sixteenth Amendment. And read Brushaber again! Have a nice day. Famspear 03:16, 6 May 2006 (UTC)

Go back and read the Brushaber decision!

BRUSHABER v UNION PACIFIC R. CO., 240 US 1, 11-12 (1916):

“…the confusion is not inherent, but rather arises from the conclusion that the 16th Amendment provides for a hitherto unknown power of taxation; that is, a power to levy an income tax which, although direct, should not be subject to the regulation of apportionment applicable to all other direct taxes. And the far-reaching effect of this erroneous assumption will be made clear by generalizing the many contentions advanced in argument to support it…”

“…the whole purpose of the Amendment was to relieve all income taxes when imposed from apportionment from a consideration of the source…”

“…on the contrary shows that it was drawn with the object of maintaining the limitations of the Constitution and harmonizing their operation.”

Editor's note: Brushaber is a terrible case for tax protesters to be citing! What the Court essentially said was that the 16th Amendment did not give the Congress a new power to tax incomes, as Congress already had that power.

The 16th Amendment -- as interpreted by the Supreme Court in the Brushaber decision -- made the dichotomy between direct and indirect taxes essentially no longer constitutionally relevant with respect to Federal income taxes. A detailed summary of Brushaber is beyond the scope of this comment; however, the following statement by the Supreme Court in Brushaber (ironically, often quoted by the tax protesters!), in referring to the prior decision in Pollock, is revealing (emphasis added):

Moreover, in addition, the conclusion reached in the Pollock Case did not in any degree involve holding that income taxes generically and necessarily came within the class of direct taxes on property, but, on the contrary, recognized the fact that taxation on income was in its nature an excise [i.e.,, an indirect tax] entitled to be enforced as such unless and until it was concluded that to enforce it would amount to accomplishing the result which the requirement as to apportionment of direct taxation was adopted to prevent, in which case the duty would arise to disregard form [i.e., its form as an indirect tax, or excise tax, which is not required to be apportioned] and consider substance alone [i.e., to treat it as a direct tax, required to be apportioned], and hence subject the tax to the regulation as to apportionment [i.e., to treat the tax as a direct tax] which otherwise[,] as an excise[,] would not apply to it. Nothing could serve to make this clearer than to recall that in the Pollock Case, in so far as the law taxed incomes from other classes of property than real estate and invested personal property, that is, income from 'professions, trades, employments, or vocations', its validity was recognized; indeed, it was expressly declared that no dispute was made upon that subject, and attention was called to the fact that taxes on such income [i.e., income from professions, trades, employments or vocations] had been sustained as excise taxes in the past.

The Court also stated (with emphasis added):

But it clearly results that the proposition and the contentions under it, if acceded to, would cause one provision of the Constitution to destroy another; that is, they would result in bringing the provisions of the Amendment exempting a direct tax from apportionment into irreconcilable conflict with the general requirement that all direct taxes be apportioned. Moreover, the tax authorized by the Amendment, being direct, would not come under the rule of uniformity applicable under the Constitution to other than direct taxes, and thus it would come to pass that the result of the Amendment would be to authorize a particular direct tax not subject either to apportionment or to the rule of geographical uniformity, thus giving power to impose a different tax in one state or states than was levied in another state or states. This result, instead of simplifying the situation and making clear the limitations on the taxing power, which obviously the Amendment must have been intended to accomplish, would create radical and destructive changes in our constitutional system and multiply confusion.

But the Court did not "accede to" Mr. Brushaber's arguments. The Court went on to reject these arguments, and Mr. Brushaber lost the case. The result of Brushaber is that although an income tax on income from property was deemed (under Pollock) to be a direct tax and an income tax on wages, etc., was deemed to be an indirect tax (an excise), the Sixteenth Amendment allows a tax on incomes without apportionment regardless of "source" -- that is, regardless of whether the tax is deemed direct (for example, a tax on income from property) or indirect (for example, a tax on income from labor).

Even in the Pollock case, taxes on income from professions, trades, employments or vocations were NOT considered direct taxes and were NOT required to be apportioned, as these were indirect taxes (i.e., excises). Further, nothing in Pollock, the 16th Amendment, or Brushaber changed that. The Court in Pollock decided that an income tax on income from property was treated as a direct tax, and therefore had to be apportioned (prior to the 16th Amendment in 1913). The Brushaber Court was saying that nothing in Pollock required that a tax on, say, wages (i.e., an indirect, or excise tax) would have to be apportioned to be constitutional.

The 16th Amendment, as interpreted by the Court in Brushaber, made the distinction between direct taxes (required to be apportioned) and indirect taxes (not required to be apportioned) irrelevant. In other words, after the 16th Amendment the Congress can constitutionally impose a tax (whether direct or indirect) on any income, regardless of "source" (i.e., regardless of whether the tax would be considered direct or indirect) without the requirement of "apportionment" among the states, and without regard to any "census or enumeration." Brushaber is a very complex case with a terrible outcome for tax protesters -- perhaps the worst case a tax protester would want to be citing! Yours, Famspear 23:11, 3 May 2006 (UTC)

F THAT IS THE CASE —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.161.10.14 (talk • contribs)

TAFT v. BOWERS, 278 U.S. 470, 481 (1929):

“Under former decisions here the settled doctrine is that the Sixteenth Amendment confers no power upon Congress to define and tax as income without apportionment something which theretofore could not have been properly regarded as income.”

Editor's note: Taft v. Bowers. Wow, another leading case that definitely should not be cited by a tax protester! The following fact pattern is based on the case of Taft v. Bowers to illustrate what the Court ruled. The taxpayer was Ms. Elizabeth Taft. Her father bought shares of stock in a company for a total cost of $1,000. The father held on to the stock until it had increased in value to $2,000, and then he gave the stock to Ms. Taft, his daughter, as a gift. Ms. Taft then held on to the stock and it went up in value by another $3,000, to $5,000 in fair market value. Ms. Taft then sold the stock to a third party for $5,000. Under the Revenue Act of 1921 (and this is still the rule today under the 1986 Code), Ms. Taft was taxed on the gain -- computed as $4,000, or $5,000 less the $1,000 carryover basis. In other words, the donor's $1,000 basis (her father's basis) carries over to the donee (Ms. Taft). Ms. Taft sued Bowers, the Collector of Internal Revenue. Ms. Taft tried to argue that her basis should be $2,000, the fair market value at the time she receive the stock from her father. Under her computation, her taxable gain would have been $5,000 less $2,000, or only $3,000. Ms. Taft argued that the increase from $1,000 to $2,000 while her FATHER held the stock was not "income" to HER within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment.

The Court rejected her argument, and stated (in part) (bolding added):

The only question subject to serious controversy is whether Congress had power to authorize the exaction.

It is said [by Ms. Taft, the taxpayer] that the gift became a capital asset of the donee [Ms. Taft] to the extent of its value when received and, therefore, when disposed of by her no part of that value could be treated as taxable income in her hands.

The Sixteenth Amendment provides:

'The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several states, and without regard to any census or enumeration.'

Income is the thing which may be taxed-income from any source. The amendment does not attempt to define income or to designate how taxes may be laid thereon, or how they may be enforced. [ . . . ]

By requiring the recipient of the entire increase [i.e., including the increase in value while the stock was owned by her father] to pay a part into the public treasury, Congress deprived her of no right and subjected her to no hardship. [ . . . ]

The provision of the statute under consideration seems entirely appropriate for enforcing a general scheme of lawful taxation. To accept the view urged in behalf of petitioner [Ms. Taft] undoubtedly would defeat, to some extent, the purpose of Congress to take part of all gain derived from capital investments.

[ . . . ] Congress had power to require that for purposes of taxation the donee [Ms. Taft] should accept the position of the donor [her father] in respect of the thing received. And in so doing, it acted neither unreasonably nor arbitrarily.

The U.S. Supreme Court rejected Ms. Taft's argument, and ruled that under the Sixteenth Amendment and the taxing statute her taxable gain on the sale of the stock was $4,000 ($5,000 less $1,000). Taft v. Bowers is still another example of a case where the validity of a taxing statute -- imposing a tax on income from sales of investments taxable to the individual, the living person who sold the investments -- was upheld. The Court ruled that all the gain was taxable as income to Ms. Taft under the Sixteenth Amendment. And for those tax protesters hung up on the "income is only corporate profits under the Sixteenth Amendment" argument, I would like to gently point out that Ms. Taft was not a "corporation." The gain on the sale was not "corporate profits." So sorry. Yours, Famspear 02:31, 4 May 2006 (UTC)

PECK v LOWE, 247 US 165, 172 (1918):

“As pointed out in recent decisions, it does not extend the taxing power to new or excepted subjects…”

Editor's note: Ahh, William E. Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165 (1918). This is another case that tax protesters cite -- apparently because they do not understand what they are reading! Particularly devastating for tax protesters is the statement in this case that the Sixteenth Amendment "does not extend the taxing power to new or excepted subjects, but merely removes all occasion, which otherwise might exist, for an apportionment among the states of taxes laid on income, whether it be derived from one source or another." Also, the Constitutionality of the tax in this case was upheld. Another dead end for tax protesters! Famspear 23:11, 3 May 2006 (UTC)

EISNER v MACOMBER, 252 US 189, 205-207 (1920):

“The 16th Amendment must be construed in connection with the taxing clauses of the original Constitution and the effect attributed to them before the amendment was adopted.”

“As repeatedly held, this did not extend the taxing power to new subjects…”

Editor's note: The case of Eisner v. Macomber actually dealt with a stock dividend on stock that was essentially equivalent to a stock split, as opposed to a cash dividend on stock. In the case of this kind of "dividend" the stockholder does not receive anything or realize any additional value. For example, if a stockholder owns 100 shares of stock having a value of $4 per share, the total value is $400. If the corporation declares, say, a "two for one" stock dividend that is essentially similar to a stock split (and the corporation distributes no money or other property), the stockholder now has 200 shares with a value of $2 each, which is still $400 in value - i.e., no increase in value and no income. The pie is still the same size -- but it's sliced into more pieces, each piece being proportionately smaller. More directly to the point, there has been no "sale or other disposition" of the stock. The taxpayer still owns the same asset (i.e., the same interest in the corporation) he owned prior to the stock dividend. So, even if his basis amount (generally, the amount he originally paid for the stock) is less than the $400 value (i.e., even if he has an unrealized or potential gain), he still has not yet "realized" the gain. This kind of stock dividend is not treated as "income" to a shareholder. The Court did not rule on any issue involving the taxability of ordinary "cash" dividends -- where the stockholder actually receives a check from the company, etc. The Court did not rule on the taxability of wages. The Court did not rule on the taxability of gains on the sale of property. Etc., etc., etc. Sorry, folks! This is definitely not a good case for tax protesters to be citing. Yours, Famspear 23:11, 3 May 2006 (UTC)

MERCHANTS’ LOAN & TRUST CO. v SMIETANKA, 255 US 509, 519 (1921):

“It is obvious that these decisions in principle rule the case at bar if the word ‘income’ has the same meaning in the Income Tax Act of 1913 that it had in the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909, and that it has the same scope of meaning was in effect decided in Southern Pacific v Lowe…, where it was assumed for the purpose of decision that there was no difference in its meaning as used in the act of 1909 and in the Income Tax Act of 1913. There can be no doubt that the word must be given the same meaning and content in the Income Tax Acts of 1916 and 1917 that it had in the act of 1913. When we add to this, Eisner v Macomber…the definition of ‘income’ which was applied was adopted from Stratton’s Independence v Howbert, supra, arising under the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909… there would seem to be no room to doubt that the word must be given the same meaning in all the Income Tax Acts of Congress that was given to it in the Corporation Excise Tax Act, and that what that meaning is has now become definitely settled by decisions of this Court.”

Editor's note: This case is Merchants’ Loan & Trust Company, as Trustee of the Estate of Arthur Ryerson, Deceased, Plaintiff in Error v. Julius F. Smietanka, formerly United States Collector of Internal Revenue for the First District of the State of Illinois, 255 U.S. 509 (1921). I love it when tax protesters cite this case. This case is sometimes cited by tax protesters as somehow supporting the theory that only "corporate profits," and not wages, are taxable. Unfortunately, neither corporate profits nor wages were at issue in the case. Even worse for tax protesters, the income in this case -- which was gain on a sale of stock, not corporate profits -- was ruled to be taxable! And the taxpayer in this case was not a corporation! The Supreme Court stated:

In determining the definition of the word "income" thus arrived at, this Court has consistently refused to enter into the refinements of lexicographers or economists and has approved, in the definitions quoted, what it believed to be the commonly understood meaning of the term which must have been in the minds of the people when they adopted the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution. [ . . . W]e continue entirely satisfied with that definition, and, since the fund here taxed was the amount realized from the sale of the stock in 1917, less the capital investment [. . .] it is palpable that it was a "gain or profit" [ . . .] and thereby became that "realized gain" which has been repeatedly declared to be taxable income within the meaning of the constitutional amendment and the acts of Congress [ . . .]

The Court in Merchants' Loan ruled that the gain on the sale of stock by an estate was taxable to that estate as part of the income of that estate under the tax statute and the Sixteenth Amendment. The Court was not presented with, and did not decide, any issue involving the taxability of wages or corporate profits or any other kind of income except the gain on the sale of the stock.

To show how bizarre the tax protesters' argument about the Merchants' Loan case really is, consider the following. Aside from the fact that the Court ruled in Merchants' Loan that the estate's gain on the sale of stock was income under the Sixteenth Amendment and the 1916 Act and was taxable under the Amendment and the Act, the tax protesters also conveniently ignore the plain text of the 1916 Act that the Court was interpreting. Forget about "estates" for a minute. With respect to individuals (not corporations), section 1(a) of the 1916 Act specifically imposes the income tax on "the entire net income received [ . . . ] from all sources by every individual, a citizen or resident of the United States [ . . . ]." Further, Section 2(a) of the Act specifically states that "the net income of a taxable person shall include gains, profits and income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service of whatever kind and in whatever form paid, or from professions, vocations, businesses, trade, commerce, or sales, or dealings in property, [ . . . ] from interest, rent, dividends, securities [ . . . ] or gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever [ . . . ]." The 1916 Act tax on the income of corporations, by the way, was imposed under section 10 of the Act -- so there is no point in trying to argue that the term "taxable person" under the 1916 Act meant only a "corporation." The Congress specifically imposed the tax on both individuals (section 1) and corporations (section 10) under that Act. Yours, Famspear 23:11, 3 May 2006 (UTC)

(c) Do respondents agree that the meaning of the word “income” was settled by decisions of the Supreme Court, and ruled as only applicable to excise tax? Yes/ No.

(d) In light of the above rulings listed in paragraph 11, do respondents agree that there were no new subjects brought under the taxing powers of the federal government by the 16th Amendment? Yes/No.

(e) In light of the above rulings listed in paragraph 11, do respondents agree that the same taxing powers of the federal government existed after the passage of 16th Amendment, as existed before the passage of the 16th Amendment? Yes/No.

(f) In light of the above rulings listed in paragraph 11, do respondents agree that the 16th Amendment did not eliminate the requirement of “apportionment” for direct taxes in the Constitution? Yes/No.

Article 1, sec. 2,“Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included in this union, according to their respective Numbers…” and also in Article 1, sec. 9, “No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.”

(g) In light of the above rulings listed in paragraph 11, do respondents agree that the literature put out by the IRS, is false and/or misleading in claiming that the 16th Amendment authorized a taxing power on every citizen? Yes/No.

(h) Do respondents agree that the 16th Amendment authorized no new taxing powers? Yes/No.

(a) Are respondents aware of the ruling of Pollock, which stated the original intention of the Founders in the Constitution? Yes/No.

Editor's note: Wake up. The Pollock decision was overturned by the Sixteenth Amendment. Yours, Famspear 23:11, 3 May 2006 (UTC)

(b) Do respondents agree that the original intent (as cited in this paragraph) of the Founders, has not been overturned or abrogated by the 16th Amendment or any other authority? Yes/No.

“Nothing can be clearer than that what the constitution intended to guard against was the exercise by the general government of the power of directly taxing persons and property within any state through a majority made up from the other states.” Pollock vs. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co., 157 US 429, 582 (1895).

Editor's note: PS: Every time you see a reference to the Pollock case, remember: The effect of the holding in Pollock (essentially, the rule that income taxes on income from property had to be apportioned to be constitutional) was overruled in 1913 by the Sixteenth Amendment. Yours, Famspear 03:42, 6 May 2006 (UTC)

Do respondents agree that the work of the laborer (the laborer’s most sacred property) could not be hindered or encroached upon before the passage of the 16th Amendment? Yes/No. “The patrimony of the poor man lies in the strength and dexterity of his own hands, and to hinder his employing this strength and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper, without injury to his neighbor, is a plain violation of this most sacred property. It is a manifest encroachment upon the just liberty both of the workman and of those who might be disposed to employ him.” Butcher's Union Co. v. Cresent City Co., 111 US 746, 757 (1884).

(a) Do respondents agree that after the passage of the 16th Amendment, the right to conduct a lawful business or vocation and thereby acquire profits, is the property of the business? Yes/No. “The court held it unconstitutional, saying: 'The right to follow any lawful vocation and to make contracts is as completely within the protection of the Constitution as the right to hold property free from unwarranted seizure, or the liberty to go when and where one will. One of the ways of obtaining property is by contract. The right, therefore, to contract cannot be infringed by the legislature without violating the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Every citizen is protected in his right to work where and for whom he will. He may select not only his employer, but also his associates.” COPPAGE v. STATE OF KANSAS, 236 U.S. 1, 23 -24 (1915).

Editor's note: Good grief. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915), was a criminal case involving a defendant convicted, under a Kansas statute, of firing an employee for refusing to resign as a member of a labor union. No issues of taxation were presented to or decided by the Court. Notice that the tax protester who dumped this text here conveniently failed to mention that -- as did the tax protester who dumped this same cite into Wikipedia in late 2005. Yours, Famspear 02:48, 4 May 2006 (UTC)

“That the right to conduct a lawful business, and thereby acquire pecuniary profits, is property, is indisputable.” TRUAX v. CORRIGAN, 257 U.S. 312, 348 (1921).

Editor's note: Truax v. Corrigan? Hello, is anybody home at the tax protester's house? Here is part of the U.S. Supreme Court's recitation of the facts of this case:

The plaintiffs in error, who were plaintiffs below, and will be so called, own, maintain and operate, on Main street, in the city of Bisbee, Ariz., a restaurant, known as the 'English Kitchen.' The defendants are cooks and waiters formerly in the employ of the plaintiffs, together with the labor union and the trades assembly of which they were members. All parties are residents of the state of Arizona.

The complaint set out the following case:

In April, 1916, a dispute arose between the plaintiffs and the defendants' union concerning the terms and conditions of employment of the members of the union. The plaintiffs refused to yield to the terms of the union, which thereupon ordered a strike of those of its members who were in plaintiffs' employ. To win the strike, and to coerce and compel the plaintiffs to comply with the demands of the union, the defendants and others unknown to the plaintiffs entered into a conspiracy and boycott to injure plaintiffs in their restaurant and restaurant business, by inducing plaintiffs' customers and others, theretofore well and favorably disposed, to cease to patronize or trade with the plaintiffs. The method of inducing was set out at length, and included picketing, displaying banners, advertising the strike, denouncing plaintiffs as 'unfair' to the union, and appealing to customers to stay away from the 'English Kitchen,' and the circulation of handbills containing abusive and libelous charges against plaintiffs, their employees, and their patrons, and intimations of injury to future patrons. Copies of the handbills were set forth in exhibits made part of the complaint.

Had enough? Can you guess what's coming next? Here it comes: Truax v. Corrigan was not a tax case. No issues regarding the Federal income tax were presented to or decided by the Court. Repeated citations to cases like this -- to argue that the Federal tax laws somehow are not what they are -- are examples of what pass for "legal analysis" by people who want to put this stuff into Wikipedia. What a waste of time. Yours, Famspear 03:03, 4 May 2006 (UTC)

(b) Do respondents agree that it is a right of every citizen or business to conduct business without let or hindrance, and the 16th Amendment did not change that? Yes/No.

(c) Do respondents agree that The right to follow any lawful vocation and to make contracts is as completely within the protection of the Constitution, and that the 16th Amendment did not change that? Yes/No.

(d) Do respondents agree that, “The right, therefore, to contract cannot be infringed by the legislature without violating the letter and spirit of the Constitution.” Yes/No.

Do respondents agree that the hindrance of any person in his lawful trade or business was declared void before the passage of the 16th Amendment, and the 16th Amendment did not change that? Yes/No. “… using of anything whereby any person or persons, bodies politic or corporate, are sought to be restrained of any freedom or liberty they had before or hindered in their lawful trade,' All grants of this kind are void at common law, because they destroy the freedom of trade, discourage labor and industry, restrain persons from getting an honest livelihood, and put it in the power of the grantees to enhance the price of commodities. They are void because they interfere with the liberty of the individual to pursue a lawful trade or employment.” Butcher's Union Co. v. Cresent City Co., 111 US 746, 756 (1884).

16. (a) Do respondents agree with the Supreme Court ruling of 1923, 10 years after the 16th Amendment was passed, that the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life is guaranteed by the Constitution? Yes/No.

MEYER v. STATE OF NEBRASKA, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923): “While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”

(b) Do respondents agree that an individual has the freedom and the right to contract and engage in the common occupations of life, and that a state may not impose a charge for such rights? Yes/No.

“A state may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the Federal Constitution.” MURDOCK v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 319 US 105, at 113; 63 S Ct at 875; 87 L Ed at 1298 (1943).

(c) Do respondents agree that Meyer vs. Kansas, 10 years after the passage of the 16th Amendment, cited all the following cases as precedence to support its ruling? Yes/No.

Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36; Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co ., 111 U.S. 746 , 4 Sup. Ct. 652; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 , 6 Sup. Ct. 1064; Minnesota v. Bar er, 136 U.S. 313 , 10 Sup. Ct. 862; Allegeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 , 17 Sup. Ct. 427; Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 , 25 Sup. Ct. 539, 3 Ann. Cas. 1133; Twining v. New Jersey 211 U.S. 78 , 29 Sup. Ct. 14; Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549 , 31 Sup. Ct. 259; Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 , 36 Sup. Ct. 7, L. R. A. 1916D, 545, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 283; Adams v. Tanner, 224 U.S. 590 , 37 Sup. Ct. 662, L. R. A. 1917F, 1163, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 973; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 , 38 Sup. Ct. 337, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 593; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 , 42 Sup. Ct. 124; Adkins v. Children's Hospital (April 9, 1923), 261 U.S. 525 , 43 Sup. Ct. 394, 67 L. Ed. --; Wyeth v. Cambridge Board of Health, 200 Mass. 474, 86 N. E. 925, 128 Am. St. Rep. 439, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 147.” MEYER v. STATE OF NEBRASKA, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).

(d) Do respondents agree with the following ruling? Yes/No.

The "liberty" guaranteed by the Constitution "must be interpreted in light of the common law, the principles and history of which were familiarly known to the framers of the Constitution." U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 654 (1898).

17. Do respondents disagree with the following law cites? Yes/No.

Taxation Key, West 53 – “The legislature cannot name something to be a taxable privilege unless it is first a privilege.”

Taxation Key, West 933 – “The Right to receive income or earnings is a right belonging to every person and realization and receipts of income is therefore not a "privilege that can be taxed".

Editor's note: EEEEyikes! Now the tax protesters are citing to "West keys"! For non-lawyer readers of Wikipedia (i.e., the normal people of this world), I won't go into detail, but basically "West keys" relate to brief digests or summaries of particular points found in court decisions, etc. These brief summaries are prepared by the editors of West Publishing, a major publisher of legal materials. As every first semester law student learns, these are only "finding tools." Lawyers use them to find stuff. They are not Primary authority. You don't actually cite them -- unless you just don't know what you're doing. See the Wikipedia article on Secondary authority. It's OK to cite certain kinds of secondary authority in limited situations; but -- citing to a digest entry associated with a West key? Embarrassing. Yours, Famspear 22:06, 5 May 2006 (UTC)

(a) Do respondents disagree with the Code of Federal Regulations definitions of direct and indirect taxes in 19 CFR 351.102? Yes/No. Direct tax. ``Direct tax means a tax on wages, profits, interests, rents, royalties, and all other forms of income, a tax on the ownership of real property, or a social welfare charge.

Editor's note: Yeah, we'll agree with that -- as long as the tax protesters let everyone know that 19 C.F.R. 351.102 is a regulation under the Tariff Act of 1930! Look, if you're going to cite Federal regulations, at least get into the general ball park. The cited reg is located in Title 19 of the Code of Federal Regulations. The relevant regs for the internal revenue laws are found in Title 26 of the Code of Federal Regulations (maybe a few in title 31 as well). More directly to the point, the definition of "direct tax" in 19 C.F.R. section 351.102 is not the same as the definition of "direct tax" as that term is used in the U.S. Constitution. Here's a clue: In law, as in other human endeavors, the same term (e.g., "direct tax") can and often does have different meanings in different places. In fact, in the United States Constitution, there is a place where the word "law" itself is used more than once in the same sentence -- with different, technical legal meanings! Come on folks. And still more directly to the point, the difference between a "direct tax" and an "indirect tax" for Federal income tax purposes became no longer legally relevant after the Sixteenth Amendment was ratified in 1913. Sorry! Read the U.S. Supreme Court decision in the Brushaber case again, and have a nice day! Yours, Famspear 20:42, 5 May 2006 (UTC)

Indirect tax. ``Indirect tax means a sales, excise, turnover, value added, franchise, stamp, transfer, inventory, or equipment tax, a border tax, or any other tax other than a direct tax or an import charge.

Editor's note: For purposes of tax protester arguments about income tax, this definition of "indirect tax" is WRONG. See separate discussion about citing to the wrong regulations! Yours, Famspear 03:42, 6 May 2006 (UTC)

(b) Do respondents agree that the definition of “direct taxes” as ruled by Knowlton vs. Moore, still applies today? Yes/No.

Knowlton v. Moore, 178 US 41, 47 (1900): "Direct Taxes bear upon persons, upon possession and the enjoyment of rights".

Editor's note: Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900) involved the constitutionality of the war revenue act of 1898 (Act of June 1898, Ch. 448, 30 Stat. 448) with respect to what we would now call Federal estate taxes (that is, a tax on the transfer of property by reason of death). This is not a good case for tax protesters to be citing, as it actually indirectly hurts their cause. The quote (from page 47 of the case) is correct. The Court was quoting, in an approving manner, a French definition of the term "direct taxes". One of the taxpayer's arguments had been that the estate tax was a direct tax and that, since the statute involved did not apportion the tax among the states according to population, the statute was unconstitutional.

The Court rejected the taxpayer's argument that the estate tax was a direct tax. Instead, the Court concluded that the estate tax "is not direct within the meaning of the Constitution, but, on the contrary, is a duty or excise [ . . . ]" Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, at 83. The significance of this is that duties and excises have never been required to be apportioned. Similarly, the Court in Brushaber (discussed elsewhere) noted that an income tax on income from employment was also an indirect tax (an excise). Again, with respect to Federal income taxes, the question of whether a particular kind of income tax is direct or indirect is moot after the Sixteenth Amendment. Yours, Famspear 23:11, 3 May 2006 (UTC)

(c) Do respondents agree with the following ruling, and that such ruling is still applicable today? Yes/No.

FLINT v STONE TRACY, 220 US 107, 151 - 152 (1911):

“Duties and imposts are terms commonly applied to levies made by governments on the importation or exportation of commodities. Excises are 'taxes laid upon the manufacture, sale, or consumption of commodities within the country, upon licenses to pursue certain occupations, and upon corporate privileges.' Cooley, Const. Lim. 7th ed. 680.”

Editor's note: Oh, darn it! In Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the corporation tax act of 1909 did not violate the constitutional requirement that revenue measures originate in the U.S. House of Representatives. The Court did not rule that excise taxes consisted only of taxes on corporations and corporate privileges, to the exclusion of taxes on income of "natural persons." In fact, the issue of the validity of an income tax imposed on "natural persons" (living, breathing people) was neither presented to the Court nor decided by the Court. Sorry, tax protesters! Yours, Famspear 23:11, 3 May 2006 (UTC)

(a) Do respondents agree that private firms and individuals do not enjoy the same privilege that corporations enjoy? See FLINT v. STONE TRACY CO below. Yes/No. (b) Do respondents agree that that there is a substantial difference in the “carrying on of business” by corporations, which are taxed for the corporate privilege, and the same “carrying on of business” by an unincorporated firm or individual? Yes/No.

“In the case at bar we have already discussed the limitations which the Constitution imposes upon the right to levy excise taxes, and it could not be said, even if the principles of the 14th Amendment were applicable to the present case, that there is no substantial difference between the carrying on of business by the corporations taxed, and the same business when conducted by a private firm or individual. The thing taxed is not the mere dealing in merchandise, in which the actual transactions may be the same, whether conducted by individuals or corporations, but the tax is laid upon the privileges which exist in conducting business with the advantages which inhere in the corporate capacity of those taxed, and which are not enjoyed by private firms or individuals.” FLINT v. STONE TRACY CO., 220 U.S. 107, 162 (1911).

(a) Are respondents aware of the two great classes of taxation (direct and indirect) ruling in Pollack and later affirmed in Brushaber? Yes/No. “Thus, in the matter of taxation, the constitution recognizes the two great classes of direct and indirect taxes, and lays down two rules by which their imposition must be governed, namely, the rule of apportionment as to direct taxes, and the rule of uniformity as to duties, imposts, and excises.” Pollock, 157 US 429, 556 (1895).

Editor's note: PS: Every time you see a reference to the Pollock case, remember: The effect of the holding in Pollock (essentially, the rule that income taxes on income from property had to be apportioned to be constitutional) was overruled in 1913 by the Sixteenth Amendment. Yours, Famspear 03:42, 6 May 2006 (UTC)

BRUSHABER v UNION PACIFIC R. CO., 240 US 1, 12 (1916),

“The court, fully recognizing in the passage which we have previously quoted the all embracing character of the two great classifications, including, on the one hand, direct taxes subject to apportionment, and on the other, excises, duties, and imposts subject to uniformity, held the law to be unconstitutional in substance for these reasons: Concluding that the classification of direct was adopted for the purpose of rendering it impossible to burden by taxation accumulations of property, real or personal, except subject to the regulation of apportionment,…”

Editor's note: Ahhh, Brushaber again. One of my favorite cases. Go read my discussion of this case again! Sorry. Yours, Famspear 23:11, 3 May 2006 (UTC)

(b) Do respondents agree that the two great classes of taxation were all embracing and that there did not exist any other class of taxation applicable to constitutional federal taxing powers? Yes/No.

(c) Do respondents agree that all direct taxes still had to be apportioned after the passage of the 16th Amendment? Yes/No.

(d) Do respondents agree that no direct taxes have been imposed on the general citizenry for at least 90 years? Yes/No.

(e) Do respondents agree that the adoption of classification of “direct taxes”, by the Founders, was the original intent of the Founders? Yes/ No.

(f) Do respondents agree that the purpose of the adoption of the classification of “direct taxes” (original intent) by the Founders, was to render the accumulations of property, i.e., wages, salaries, and property, impossible to tax by the federal government, except by apportionment? Yes/No.

(g) Do respondents agree that Stratton’s ruled that property, considered by itself, was not taxable? Yes/No.

STRATTON'S INDEPENDENCE, LTD. v. HOWBERT, 231 U.S. 399, 417 (1913):

“Evidently Congress adopted the income as the measure of the tax to be imposed with respect to the doing of business in corporate form because it desired that the excise should be imposed, approximately at least, with regard to the amount of benefit presumably derived by such corporations from the current operations of the government. In Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. 220 U.S. 107, 165 , 55 S. L. ed. 107, 419, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 342, Ann. Cas. 1912 B. 1312, it was held that Congress, in exercising the right to tax a legitimate subject of taxation as a franchise [231 U.S. 399, 417] or privilege, was not debarred by the Constitution from measuring the taxation by the total income, although derived in part from property which, considered by itself, was not taxable.”

(h) Do respondents agree that the 16th Amendment did not grant additional federal taxing powers that would change the “apportionment provision” of the Constitution? Yes/ No.

Are respondents aware of the purpose of the 16th Amendment? Yes/No. BRUSHABER v UNION PACIFIC R. CO., 240 US 1, 12, 18 (1916):

“…the whole purpose of the Amendment was to relieve all income taxes when imposed from apportionment from a consideration of the source…”

Editor's note: Brushaber again? Wow, some people are gluttons for punishment! Yours, Famspear 23:11, 3 May 2006 (UTC)

(a) Are respondents aware that the 1954 House Discussion on Code section 61(a) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code states the following? Yes/No. “This definition is based upon the 16th Amendment and the word ‘income’ is used in its constitutional sense.” “This section corresponds to section 22 (a) of the 1939 Code.”

(b) Do respondents agree that the 16th Amendment’s use of the word “income” only has significance in its constitutional sense? Yes/No.

(c) Do respondents agree that the word “income” in the Internal Revenue Code is used in its constitutional sense? Yes/No.

Do respondents agree that Congress cannot define the word “income” and pass such definition into law? Yes/No. EISNER v MACOMBER, 252 US 189, 205 - 206 (1920):

“In order, therefore, that the clauses cited from article 1 of the Constitution may have proper force and effect, save only as modified by the amendment, and that the latter also may have proper effect, it becomes essential to distinguish between what is and what is not 'income,' as the term is there used, and to apply the distinction, as cases arise, according to truth and substance, without regard to form. Congress cannot by any definition it may adopt conclude the matter, since it cannot by legislation alter the Constitution, from which alone it derives its power to legislate, and within whose limitations alone that power can be lawfully exercised.”

Editor's note: See my discussion of Eisner v. Macomber. Yours, Famspear 23:11, 3 May 2006 (UTC)

(a) Do respondents agree that there is a distinction between “Gross Income” and “Gross Receipts”? Yes/No. (b) Do respondents agree that “gross income” is defined as “… ‘gross income’ means the total sales, less the cost of goods sold, plus any income from investments and from incidental or outside operations or sources.”?

(c) Do respondents agree that “Gross receipts” are not the foundation for income tax liability? Yes/No.

(d) Do respondents agree that the general term “income” is not defined in the Internal Revenue Code? Yes/No.

U.S. v. BALLARD, 535 F2d 400 (1976): “Gross income and not ‘gross receipts’ is the foundation of income tax liability…”

At 404, “The general term ‘income’ is not defined in the Internal Revenue Code.”

Editor's note: Ahh United States v. Ballard, 535 F.2d 400 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 918 (1976). The statement that "income" (for purposes of the Federal income tax) is not defined in the Internal Revenue Code is correct! Income is not defined in the Constitution either! In fact, the vast majority of words in statutes, etc., -- even some of the most important words -- are not now and have never been defined in the statutes. I hope this does not come as too much of a shock, but under the U.S. legal system, there is no law requiring that a word in a constitution, statute, court decision, etc., be defined in the statute, etc. (or anywhere else). Some words are defined and others are not. For example, "gross income," "adjusted gross income" and "taxable income" are defined in the Internal Revenue Code. Another red herring used impotently by tax protesters. Yours, Famspear 23:11, 3 May 2006 (UTC)

At 404, BALLARD further ruled that “… ‘gross income’ means the total sales, less the cost of goods sold, plus any income from investments and from incidental or outside operations or sources.”

(e) Do respondents agree that, “… ‘gross income’ means the total sales, less the cost of goods sold, plus any income from investments and from incidental or outside operations or sources.” and nothing else? Yes/No.

(a) Are respondents aware of the definition of the word “income”, as defined by the Supreme Court? Yes/No MERCHANTS’ LOAN & TRUST CO. v SMIETANKA, 255 US 509, 519 (1921):

“The Corporation Excise Tax Act of August 5, 1909, was not an income tax law, but a definition of the word ‘income’ was so necessary in its administration…”

“It is obvious that these decisions in principle rule the case at bar if the word ‘income’ has the same meaning in the Income Tax Act of 1913 that it had in the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909, and that it has the same scope of meaning was in effect decided in Southern Pacific v Lowe…, where it was assumed for the purpose of decision that there was no difference in its meaning as used in the act of 1909 and in the Income Tax Act of 1913. There can be no doubt that the word must be given the same meaning and content in the Income Tax Acts of 1916 and 1917 that it had in the act of 1913. When we add to this, Eisner v Macomber…the definition of ‘income’ which was applied was adopted from Stratton’s Independence v Howbert, supra, arising under the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909… there would seem to be no room to doubt that the word must be given the same meaning in all the Income Tax Acts of Congress that was given to it in the Corporation Excise Tax Act, and that what that meaning is has now become definitely settled by decisions of this Court.”

Editor's note: Merchant's again! See my discussion. Yours, Famspear 23:11, 3 May 2006 (UTC)

To reiterate, the Supreme Court in Merchants' Loan ruled that a gain on a sale of stock (not a "corporate profit") realized by an estate (not a "corporation") was taxable to that estate. Nowhere in the Merchants' Loan case did the Court say that "income" under the Sixteenth Amendment meant only "corporate profits." The term "corporate profit" does not even appear in the text of the Court's decision! The law imposing the tax in this case was not the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909. The law in imposing the tax -- which was upheld -- was the 1916 income tax act. Yours, Famspear 18:40, 5 May 2006 (UTC)

DOYLE v. MITCHELL BROS. CO., 247 U.S. 179, 183 (1918): 

"An examination of these and other provisions of the Act (Corporation Excise Tax Act of August 5, 1909) make it plain that the legislative purpose was not to tax property as such, or the mere conversion of property, but to tax the conduct of the business of corporations organized for profit upon the gainful returns from their business operations."

DOYLE v. MITCHELL BROS. CO. , 247 U.S. 179, 185 (1918):

“Whatever difficulty there may be about a precise and scientific definition of 'income,' it imports, as used here, something entirely distinct from principal or capital either as a subject of taxation or as a measure of the tax; conveying rather the idea of gain or increase arising from corporate activities.”

(b) Do the respondents agree that all the income tax acts of Congress must be given the same meaning as was given to the word “income” and as was given in the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909? Yes/No.

Editor's note: Ah, here's the old "Merchants' Loan case must somehow mean that income means only corporate profits argument" again. Sorry, but neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor any other court has ever ruled that for Federal income tax purposes "income" means "only corporate profits." See my separate discussions on the Merchants' Loan case -- where the Court ruled that gain on a sale of stock was income to a decedent's estate (not a "corporation") and was taxable to that estate. A decedent's estate is not a corporation. A gain on a sale of stock is not a "corporate profit." Sorry, tax protesters! Yours, Famspear 19:44, 5 May 2006 (UTC)

(c) Do respondents agree that the word “income” used in all the income tax acts have the same meaning as for an excise tax? Yes/No.

(d) Do respondents agree that the “conversion of property” includes the conversion of a man’s labor (his most sacred property) given in exchange for wages or compensation (property)? Yes/ No.

(a) Do respondents agree that income is necessarily the product of the joint efforts of the state and the recipient? Yes/No. “Income is necessarily the product of the joint efforts of the state and the recipient of the income, the state furnishing the protection necessary to enable the recipient to produce, receive, and enjoy it, and a tax thereon in the last analysis is simply a portion cut from the income and appropriated by the state as its share…” Sims v. Ahrens et al., 271 SW Reporter at 730.

Editor's note: Aw shucks. Simms v. Ahrens (and I think it's "Simms" not "Sims," but hey I could be wrong about something) is not even a Federal tax case! No issues regarding the validity of Federal tax law were decided by the court! Too bad. Yours, Famspear 23:26, 3 May 2006 (UTC)

(b) Do respondents agree that the privilege of incorporation is a benefit bestowed by the State, providing the protections to the recipient of the income? Yes/No.

(a) Do respondents agree that the individual’s “right to live” includes his ability to feed and house himself and those dependent on his ability? Yes/No. Redfield v. Fisher, 135 Or. 180, 292 P. 813, 819 (Ore. 1930): "The individual, unlike the corporation, cannot be taxed for the mere privilege of existing. The corporation is an artificial entity which owes its existence and charter powers to the state; but the individual's rights to live and own property are natural rights for the enjoyment of which an excise cannot be imposed."

Editor's note: Umm, can you guess what's coming? Redfield v. Fisher is not a Federal tax case! No issues regarding the validity of Federal tax law were decided by the court! Getting old, isn't it? Yours, Famspear 23:28, 3 May 2006 (UTC)

(b) Do respondents agree that, “The corporation is an artificial entity which owes its existence and charter powers to the state.”, and that its existence can be taxed, unlike the existence of the individual? Yes/No.

Do the respondents agree that the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909 was an excise tax on the corporation privilege, and not a tax on the income of the corporation? Yes/No. STRATTON’S INDEPENDENCE, LTD. v HOWBERT, 231 US 399, 414-415, (1913):

“As has been repeatedly remarked, the corporation tax act of 1909 was not intended to be and is not, in any proper sense, an income tax law. This court had decided in the Pollock Case that the income tax law of 1894 amounted in effect to a direct tax upon property, and was invalid because not apportioned according to populations, as prescribed by the Constitution. The act of 1909 avoided this difficulty by imposing not an income tax, but an excise tax upon the conduct of business in a corporate capacity, measuring, however, the amount of tax by the income of the corporation, with certain qualifications prescribed by the act itself.”

“Moreover, the section imposes ‘ a special excise tax with respect to the carrying on or doing business by such corporation,’ etc…”

“Corporations engaged in such business share in the benefits of the federal government, and ought as reasonably to contribute to the support of that government as corporations that conduct other kinds of profitable business.”

“… the annual gains of such corporations are certainly to be taken as income for the purpose of measuring the amount of the tax.”

STANTON v BALTIC MINING CO., 240 US 103, 112-114 (1916):

“Not being within the authority of the 16th Amendment, the tax is therefore, within the ruling of Pollock… a direct tax and void for want of compliance with the regulation of apportionment.”

Editor's note: See my discussion about this quote elsewhere. Again, this is a dishonest attempt by tax protesters to mislead Wikipedia readers into thinking this quote is part of the Court's decision in Stanton. This quote is the taxpayer's argument -- an argument that the Court rejected. Sorry, tax protesters! Yours, Famspear 03:42, 6 May 2006 (UTC)

“…it manifestly disregards the fact that by the previous ruling it was settled that the provisions of the 16th Amendment conferred no new power of taxation..”

Editor's note: Already discussed elsewhere on this page! Yours, Famspear 03:42, 6 May 2006 (UTC)

“…it was settled in Stratton’s Independence… that such tax is not a tax upon property… but a true excise levied on the result of the business..”

Do respondents agree that the corporate income tax is a tax on the privilege of carrying out business in a corporate capacity? Yes/ No. (a) Do respondents agree that the annual gains of corporations are only used to measure the amount of tax, but the gains are not themselves taxed? Yes/No. DOYLE v. MITCHELL BROS., 247 U.S. 179, 183 (1918):

"An examination of these and other provisions of the Act make it plain that the legislative purpose was not to tax property as such, or the mere conversion of property, but to tax the conduct of the business of corporations organized for profit upon the gainful returns from their business operations."

(b) Do respondents agree that even corporations cannot be taxed directly on their earnings, as that would be a direct tax on property? Yes/No.

(c) Do respondents agree that the word “income” in its constitutional sense pertains only to a gain or increase arising from corporate activities? Yes/No.

(d) Do respondents agree that the prohibition against an un-apportioned direct tax is a constitutional right? Yes/No.

“`[T]his Court now has rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a governmental benefit is characterized as a “right” or as a “privilege.”’” Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 644 (1973) (quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971)).

Do respondents agree that the income tax is such a vague statute, that it violates the first essential of due process? Yes/No. "(A) statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law." Connally v General Construction Co., 269 US 385, 391 (1926).

(a) Do respondents agree that USC 7608 is a code section that pertains to all enforcement authority of all IRS agents, criminal and non-criminal, and is rendered all-inclusive by the term “or other internal revenue officer by whatever term designated”? Yes/No. 26 USC Sec. 7608. - Authority of internal revenue enforcement officers

“(a) Enforcement of subtitle E and other laws pertaining to liquor, tobacco, and firearms

“Any investigator, agent, or other internal revenue officer by whatever term designated, whom the Secretary charges with the duty of enforcing any of the criminal, seizure, or forfeiture provisions of subtitle E or of any other law of the United States pertaining to the commodities subject to tax under such subtitle for the enforcement of which the Secretary is responsible…”

(b) Do respondents agree that “Any investigator, agent, or other internal revenue officer by whatever term designated” only has enforcement authority under the provisions of “subtitle E or of any other law of the United States pertaining to the commodities subject to tax”. Yes/No.

(c) Do respondents agree that Charles Conces has not had any matters of dealing with “Any investigator, agent, or other internal revenue officer by whatever term designated” under the provisions of “subtitle E or of any other law of the United States pertaining to the commodities subject to tax”. Yes/No.

(d) Do respondents agree that it was an act of fraud, or at least an error, for the DOJ lawyers and Judge Quist to claim that this statute was limited to criminal investigators and criminal matters. Yes/No.

(d) Do respondents agree that fraud vitiates everything into which it enters, according to the rulings of the courts. See McNally v. U.S., 483 U.S. 350, 371-372 (1987), Quoting U.S. v Holzer, 816 F.2d. 304, 307.

(a) Do respondents agree that a judgment obtained by means of fraud, voids the judgment? Yes/No. “Void order which is one entered by court which lacks jurisdiction over parties or subject matter, or lacks inherent power to enter judgment, or order procured by fraud, can be attacked at any time, in any court, either directly or collaterally, provided that party is properly before court”, People ex rel. Brzica v. Village of Lake Barrington, 644 N.E.2d 66 (Ill.App. 2 Dist. 1994).

(b) Do respondents agree that, “Knowing failure to disclose material information necessary to prevent statement from being misleading, or making representation despite knowledge that it has no reasonable basis in fact, are actionable as fraud under law”?

“Sovereign immunity does not apply where (as here) government is a lawbreaker or jurisdiction is the issue.” Arthur v. Fry, 300 F.Supp. 622 (1960).

“Knowing failure to disclose material information necessary to prevent statement from being misleading, or making representation despite knowledge that it has no reasonable basis in fact, are actionable as fraud under law.” Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 1990.

“Party in interest may become liable for fraud by mere silent acquiescence and partaking of benefits of fraud.” Bransom v. Standard Hardware, Inc., 874 S.W.2d 919, 1994.

(a) Do respondents agree that they have not provided the Statute At Large, the Code Section, or the Implementing Regulation of the alleged law, which was allegedly “interfered with”? Yes/No. The LAW of the case must affirmatively appear in record, which in the instance of a tax controversy necessarily includes taxing and liability statutes with attending regulations. (See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MENK, 260 F.Supp. 784, 787 and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. COMMUNITY TV INC., 327 F.2d 79 (10th Circuit 1964).

(b) Do respondents agree that the law, taxing and liability statutes, have not appeared on the record?

Do respondents agree that by concealing information in the material matter as to which laws or regulations were violated, that the respondents were guilty of violating their fiduciary obligation and committed acts of fraud? Yes/No. (a) Do respondents agree that if all persons dealing with the government are charged with knowing the government statutes and regulations, then does it not follow that the DOJ attorneys should also be able to provide the statutes and regulations, which they claimed that Charles Conces allegedly “interfered with”? Yes/No. (b) Do respondents agree that if a person requests a government agent to provide the authority under which the agent operates, and that agent refuses to provide that authority or even respond, does that not constitute fraud? Yes/No.

Lavin v. Marsh, 644 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1981): “Persons dealing with the government are charged with knowing government statutes and regulations, and they assume the risk that government agents may exceed their authority and provide misinformation,” 644 F.2d, at 1383.

Bollow v. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 650 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1981) held:

"All persons in the United States are chargeable with knowledge of the Statutes-at-Large....[I]t is well established that anyone who deals with the government assumes the risk that the agent acting in the government's behalf has exceeded the bounds of his authority," 650 F.2d, at 1100.

(a) Do respondents agree that W-4 forms that are required to be filed with employers under 26 USC 3401 through 3405, are only required to be filed by employees, as defined by 26 USC 3401? Yes/No. 26 USC 3401, (c) Employee For purposes of this chapter, the term ``employee includes an officer, employee, or elected official of the United States, a State, or any political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing. The term ``employee also includes an officer of a corporation.”

(b) Do respondents agree that the definition of “employee” in 26 USC 3401 (c), cannot be expanded by implication beyond the clear import of the language? Yes/No.

GOULD v. GOULD , 245 U.S. 151 (1917): “In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes it is the established rule not to extend their provisions, by implication, beyond the clear import of the language used, or to enlarge their operations so as to embrace matters not specifically pointed out. In case of doubt they are construed most strongly against the government, and in favor of the citizen. United States v. Wigglesworth, 2 Story, 369, Fed. Cas. No. 16,690; American Net & Twine Co. v. Worthington, 141 U.S. 468, 474 , 12 S. Sup. Ct. 55; Benziger v. United States, 192 U.S. 38, 55 , 24 S. Sup. Ct. 189.”

Editor's note: The actual holding of Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917), was that under the Revenue Act of 1913, Congress did not intend that alimony would be included in the income of the recipient for Federal income tax purposes. The effect of the holding of Gould v. Gould was effectively overruled by subsequent legislation. Under current law -- Internal Revenue Code section 71 -- alimony is taxable to the recipient. Yours Famspear 02:23, 8 May 2006 (UTC)

(c) Do respondents agree that this is a material matter in this case? Yes/No.

(a) Do respondents agree that 26 USC 6332 (c) requires that any surrender to the IRS of bank deposits by a bank, must be accompanied by an attachment or execution under judicial process? Yes/No. “Special rule for banks

“Any bank (as defined in section 408(n)) shall surrender (subject to an attachment or execution under judicial process) any deposits (including interest thereon) in such bank only after 21 days after service of levy.”

(b) Do respondents agree that the definition of “attachment or execution under judicial process” in 26 USC 6332 (c), cannot be expanded by implication beyond the clear import of the language? Yes/No.

(c) Do respondents agree that, “In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes” that “In case of doubt they are construed most strongly against the government, and in favor of the citizen”? Yes/No.

GOULD v. GOULD , 245 U.S. 151 (1917): “In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes it is the established rule not to extend their provisions, by implication, beyond the clear import of the language used, or to enlarge their operations so as to embrace matters not specifically pointed out. In case of doubt they are construed most strongly against the government, and in favor of the citizen. United States v. Wigglesworth, 2 Story, 369, Fed. Cas. No. 16,690; American Net & Twine Co. v. Worthington, 141 U.S. 468, 474 , 12 S. Sup. Ct. 55; Benziger v. United States, 192 U.S. 38, 55 , 24 S. Sup. Ct. 189.”

Editor's note: Again, the actual holding of Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917), was that under the Revenue Act of 1913, Congress did not intend that alimony would be included in the income of the recipient for Federal income tax purposes. The effect of the holding of Gould v. Gould was effectively overruled by subsequent legislation. Under current law -- Internal Revenue Code section 71 -- alimony is taxable to the recipient. Yours Famspear 02:23, 8 May 2006 (UTC)

(d) Do respondents agree that a mere “notice of levy” is not an actual levy, and that a notice of levy is fraud without an actual levy being perfected or accomplished? Yes/No.

(e) Do respondents know that the IRS routinely serves a mere “notice of levy” on banks and employers, without having perfected or accomplished an actual levy, and without an attachment or writ under judicial process? Yes/No.

(f) Do respondents agree that a 668-B (LEVY) form must be filled out and completed before a 668-A, 668-W, or 668-Y (NOTICE OF LEVY) can be sent out? Yes/No.

"Under the 1939 Code, effective with respect to distraint and seizure and sale actions prior to January 1, 1955, levy or distraint on personal or real property in the possession of a taxpayer was authorized by a signed Warrant for Distraint, Form 69, which commanded the collection officer to take the necessary distraint action. Under the 1954 Code, effective with respect to all collection actions after December 31, 1954, the levy and distraint action will be authorized by a new form, Levy, Form 668-B, January 1955. This form (668-B, not 668-W, notice of levy), properly executed, directs the collection officer to levy upon, and to sell so much of the property and rights to property, either real or personal, of the taxpayer liable, as may be necessary to satisfy the taxes enumerated in the levy. The Form will not require any accompanying documents, since the Form, properly prepared, will contain all information necessary to meet the statutory requirements (emphasis added)." Henderson v. Internal Revenue Service, Kleinrock's Tax Court Reported, 1994-486, S.D.Indiana, Case # IP 93-1699-C, Filed May 31, 1994.

"A 'Levy' requires that property be brought into legal custody through seizure, actual or constructive, and is absolute appropriation in law of property levied on, and MERE NOTICE OF INTENT TO LEVY IS INSUFFICIENT" (Emphasis added). United States v. O'Dell, 160 F. 2d 304, 307 (6th Circuit 1947).

(a) Do respondents agree that the IRS agents charged with enforcement (note: who are only authorized to collect excise taxes under 26 USC 7608), have repeatedly made up bogus assessments, “under color of law”, in violation of administrative due process as required by law. Bogus assessments go out with no date of assessment and no signature by an assessment officer. Yes/No. (b) Do respondents agree that this is a material matter in this case? Yes/No.

CFR Sec. 301.6203-1 Method of assessment. “The amount of the assessment shall, in the case of tax shown on a return by the taxpayer, be the amount so shown, and in all other cases the amount of the assessment shall be the amount shown on the supporting list or record. The date of the assessment is the date the summary record is signed by an assessment officer.”

“…A signature requirement protects the taxpayer by ensuring that a responsible officer has approved the assessment…”, CURLEY v. U.S., Cite as 791 F. Supp 52 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)

Internal Revenue Manual 3(17)(63)(14).1: (2) All tax assessments must be recorded on Form 23C Assessment Certificate. The Assessment Certificate must be signed by the Assessment Officer and dated. The Assessment Certificate is the legal document that permits collection activity…

(c) Do respondents agree that an unsigned “assessment” violates the law? Yes/No.

(d) Do respondents agree that and undated “assessment” violates the law? Yes/No.

(e) Do respondents agree that an “assessment” must be recorded on a form 23C assessment certificate? Yes/No.

(f) Do respondents agree that collection actions are not permitted without an assessment certificate? Yes/No.

Charles F. Conces reserves the right to challenge each and every answer by the respondents. Refusal to answer the above questions shall be construed as an act of “bad faith” and a refusal of respondent’s fiduciary obligation.

This Court and the DOJ attorneys are hereby given notice that the responses, or non-responses, shall create presumptions, which shall be relied upon in any and all future proceedings or actions.

—The preceding unsigned text dump was added by 64.173.197.166 (talk • contribs) on 3 May 2006.

[Editor's Note: A large portion of the court decisions cited in the May 3, 2006, text dump above have already been cited in text dumps in late 2005, and are already discussed in the Talk (Discussion) pages of Wikipedia. The anonymous text dumper's comments to the contrary notwithstanding, there may or may not be a copyright concern with respect to this text dump. Regarding the court decisions, these are the same court decisions cited over and over by tax protesters as somehow standing for various arguments that the Federal income tax is unconstitutional, invalid, etc., or that it is "misapplied" or somehow applies only to "corporate profits," etc., etc. Unfortunately, as already discussed in the Wikipedia talk pages, none of the courts in any of these cases have ever so ruled. In fact, the cited cases and all other cases decided since 1913, the year of advent of the modern income tax, say exactly the opposite of what the tax protesters say these cases say. Stay tuned. Yours, Famspear 18:04, 3 May 2006 (UTC)]