Operation Gunung Gede

Operation Gunung Gede
Part of Darul Islam rebellion
Date 19 - 24 March 1957 Location Sukabumi, West Java Result Indonesian Marines victory Indonesian Marines succeeded in killing several members of the DI/TII Leadership gang Kartosuwiryo
Belligerents
Indonesia ABRI Indonesian Marine Corps	Islamic State of Indonesia
Commanders and leaders
Capt. Boy Abidin Nrp.546/P. (Danki) Lt. Pratowo Soedibyo NRP.698/P. (Danton I) Lt. Soegito NRP.755/P. (Danton II)	Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwiryo
Strength
200 Soldiers	unknown
Casualties and losses
Indonesian Marines succeeded in killing several members of the DI/TII gang.

Operation Gunung Gede (Indonesian: Operasi Gunung Gede Pangrango) was an Indonesian marines and KKO-AL military operation to hunt down and repel the DI/TII Kartosuwiryo gang hiding in Gunung Gede Pangrango in 1957. After Operation Indra in the Indramayu, West Java area in March 1953, namely in an effort to help the local Unity to defeat the DI/TII gangs Kartosuwiryo from the sea. So for the second time the KKO-AL unit has taken part in the same security operation. The operation codenamed "Operasi Gunung gede ", this operation took place from March 19, 1957, to March 24, 1957. The operation was carried out based on verbal orders from the KSAL which was then followed by a telegram KSAL 18-13 -30 March 1957/079, namely to second 2 Platoons of KKO-AL Troops to the 8-TT Infantry Regiment III, in the context of Security Operations.

Preparation

For assignments in this Security Operation, a KKO-AL Combat Organization has been prepared with a strength of 2 reinforced platoons (1 Company), with the Company Commander Captain KKO Boy Abidin Nrp.546/P. Meanwhile, the platoon composition is as follows: 1st Platoon under the leadership of Lt.KKO. Pratowo Soedibyo Nrp.698/P and Platoon II under the leadership of Lt.KKO Soegijo Nrp.755/P. and target areas have been determined around Mount Gede Pangrango, West Java.

Tasks

In accordance with the Navy KKO Commander's Order No.079/SP/KKO/57, dated March 18, 1957, the duties of the Navy KKO Troops are as follows:

1. Assist the 8-TT.III Infantry Regiment Unit in its efforts to destroy the power of the DI/TII gang Kartosuwiryo.
2. Carry out clean-up operations against gang units that are separated from their parent.

Implementation

The Gunung Gede operation was carried out based on the Regimental Operations Order dated 19 March 1957, in just a few days, namely from 19 March 1957 to 24 March 1957. In short, the implementation of this operation was because the Mission (Task) assigned to the KKO-AL Troops had been can be achieved where gang activities around Mount Pangrango can be suppressed and neutralized. On March 19, 1957, KKO-AL troops arrived in Sukabumi and then immediately reported to the Commander of the 8.TT.III Infantry Regiment and to the 311th Army Battalion which at that time was carrying out operational duties. After reporting themselves, the KKOAL troops continued their movement to Cipanas and to Cibodas, in Cibodas this was the new Lt.KKO. Prawoto Soedibjo as Danton I explained to the members the purpose than his arrival in the area. March 20, 1957 KKO-AL Troops together with a CI Bn. 311 began moving to the high areas around Cibodas with the intention of looking for gang nests according to information obtained from local officers, but apparently during this movement no gangs were found at all, only former gang huts were found. only, which had just been abandoned by the mob, then the troops rested (overnight) on the slopes of Mount Pangrango and Mount Gede. The next day, March 21, 1957, the troops continued their movement to the top of Mount Pangrango, the journey continued to approach with closed terrain and the air was constantly foggy with very cold air. Then the gang ran away, leaving behind several victims. During the battle, important documents were seized which were then handed over to the 8th Infantry Regiment in Sukabumi.

The success of this attack was due to a sudden ambush carried out by the KKO-AL Unit where the gang had no idea that an attack would occur. This was proven when the KKOAL troops approached the gang's nest to a distance of 15 meters, and this was the opportunity for an intensive attack, so that in such a situation, the mob panicked and was devastated and left behind victims and others who were not able to run away. Furthermore, KKO-AL troops continued to pursue the remains The hordes fled to Pasir Datar and finally the troops were able to reach Ciheuleng Waterfall. And it was here on March 23, 1957, that a second battle occurred with the DI/TII Kartosuwiryo gang, the battle lasted approximately 10 minutes. With a quick and sure movement the mob was finally repulsed. The horde retreated to the north where there were many mountains and wild forests. With the completion of the battle at Curug Ciheuleng, the troops moved south to Pasir Datar and it turned out that during this last movement there was no armed contact. In accordance with the order issued by the 8.TT III Siliwangi Infantry Regiment, the movement of the Navy KKO Troops ended here at 20.00 evening the troops returned to Sukabumi. From Sukabumi that same night at 22.00 the troops continued to return to Jakarta carried by 7 TNI AD trucks. And finally arrived in Jakarta safely at 03.00 in the morning (24 March 1957).

Aftermath

1. KKO-AL succeeded in killing several members of the DI/TII gang and confiscating documents during two battles.
2. KKO-AL has gained new experience in carrying out operations in inland and mountainous areas with densely forested terrain and quite cold weather. The weather in this operational area is always filled with thick fog and this means that the troops have to be careful in carrying out their movements apart from losing sight of the front and surroundings, also because the road taken by the troops has to climb and descend, the road itself has never been crossed by humans. However, the KKO-AL troops who carried out the operation were still able to carry out their duties and obligations both day and night and did not know the hard work and difficulty of the journey they had to make during the movement from Cibodas to Pasir Datar, so that the enemy (the gang) did not suspect anything at all. that KKO-AL troops would arrive at their place and attack their defenses. This proves that KKO-AL troops are not only capable of carrying out landing operations in coastal areas, but even in security operations in inland and mountainous areas with bad forest and weather conditions, KKO-AL is capable and able to do it well.