Draft:The Arctic Council and geopolitics

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The Arctic Council acts as the primary intergovernmental forum of the Arctic region during a period characterized by some academics as a rise in Arctic geopolitics following the Russian Invasion of Ukraine in 2021. The relationship between the Arctic Council and geopolitics remains a contentious area of study regarding the capacity of the Council to mitigate geopolitical contestations between Arctic states and the emergence of a conflictual geopolitical arena. The primary areas of study in this field are as follows - Unilateral geopolitical policies by Arctic states, observer states and the capacity of the council to manage geopolitical escalations.

Perspectives on the Arctic Council's Capacity[edit]

Several contending perspectives are held on the Arctic Councils capacity to mitigate the risks of rising geopolitical contestation in Arctic waters. Academics have studied the institutions structural composition and legal framework to construct these perspectives on the relationship between the Council and Arctic geopolitics.

Critiques on the Councils Structural and Legal Capacity[edit]

Some Academics such as Matthew S. Wiseman contend that the Arctic Council is merely an intergovernmental "high level forum" that encourages cooperation among the Arctic states, but ultimately is an interest of the states.[1]. Wiseman argues that the region faces the risk of future geopolitical competition, and highlights the Arctic Councils lack of authority to mitigate conflict. Outlining the structural limitations and incapacity to formulate legally binding agreements to its member states[1]. Instead the foundational legal authority over Arctic waters is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS)[2]. Other issue domains such as Arctic indigenous affairs, environmental protection and emergency search and rescue response agreements (Arctic SAR) have seen successful results of cooperation through the Arctic Council framework. The Arctic Councils founding document the Ottawa Declaration limits the institution to these mentioned domains, stating "the Arctic Council should not deal with matters related to military security."[3]. This prevents cooperation in the areas of regional security, immigration, and militarization, which academics such as Wiseman argue makes the Council redundant in preventing the rise in a geopolitically contested Arctic region.

Intergovernmentalism fostered by the Council has also been critiqued by academic observers. The method of cooperation has been flagged by skeptical academics of the institution's existing structures resulting in the Council's inadequacies in prevailing over the unitary interests of its member states[4]

The Relevant Role of the Arctic Council in Geopolitics[edit]

Academics such as Lassi Heinien and Nicol N. Heather posit that the Arctic Council plays a central and significant role in through acting as the highest form of Arctic multilateralism, therefore naturally maintaining the potential capacity to mediate competing geopolitical state interests in Arctic waters[5]. This position is supplemented by the councils procedural processes being appraised for their effectiveness in identifying Arctic issues, forming a consensus among member states which results in a collective policy responses[6].

Geopolitical contestations such as emerging maritime disputes over waters with rare earth metals, oil and fish stocks, alongside sovereignty claims by some political scientists to most likely be resolved through the Arctic Council framework[7].

Observer States[edit]

The thaw of Arctic ice's shift in the geopolitical landscape of the region has caught the eye of several non-Arctic states and supernational institutions seeking to gain a geopolitical foothold in the emerging region through observer status in the Arctic Council. Observer status established through the Councils 2013 institutional reforms introduced observer status for non-Arctic states, permitting states to exert soft geopolitical influence and power over common Arctic waters[8]. Since 2013, several non-Arctic states have taken interest in the region obtaining observer status. Including France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, China, Poland, India, Korea, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom[9].

The European Union's Arctic Geopolitics[edit]

The European Union Commission has expressed geopolitical concerns over the region, specifically on climate change, the opening of Arctic waters, Arctic territorialization, and the rising regional security complex[10]. Respondent to these concerns, the EU has outlined a vague and still developing pursuit of regional multilateralism and commitment to promoting regional security[11]. EU member states have the potential to act as spring-boards (Denmark, Sweden and Finland) for the EU to increase its involvement in the Arctic[10].

China as a 'Near Arctic Actor'[edit]

China’s global rise as a competing superpower and maintaining an observer status in the Council has expressed interest as a ‘near-Arctic state’[12]. Academic analysis on Chinese geopolitics in the Arctic cover an array of topics. Political Scientist Stephanie Pezard postulates that China's China’s current policy is interventionist in nature and believes that the Arctic is a region cannot be managed only by the Arctic states[13]. In her assessment, China's geopolitical posturing and active shipping through the Russian Northern Sea Route suggest a rise in Chinese opportunist thinking, and a more assertive posturing by the state[14]. Other literature has supported this conclusion, such as Chinese satellite surveillance[15], investment of a 'Polar Silk Road'[14]. Realist political scientists have attributed China's Arctic policy as a part of wider global domination[16]. Other literature apposed these realist assumptions, and argues China's geopolitical posturing understands the necessity of regional cooperation with Arctic states[17]

References[edit]

  1. ^ a b Wiseman, Matthew S. (2020), Coates, Ken S.; Holroyd, Carin (eds.), "The Future of the Arctic Council", The Palgrave Handbook of Arctic Policy and Politics, Cham: Springer International Publishing, pp. 439–452, doi:10.1007/978-3-030-20557-7_27, ISBN 978-3-030-20557-7, retrieved 2023-12-23
  2. ^ International Maritime Organization (2023-12-23). "United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea". Retrieved 2023-12-23.
  3. ^ "The Arctic Council". Arctic Council. Retrieved 2023-12-23.
  4. ^ Wiseman, Matthew S. (2020), Coates, Ken S.; Holroyd, Carin (eds.), "The Future of the Arctic Council", The Palgrave Handbook of Arctic Policy and Politics, Cham: Springer International Publishing, pp. 439–452, doi:10.1007/978-3-030-20557-7_27, ISBN 978-3-030-20557-7, retrieved 2023-12-23
  5. ^ Heininen, Lassi; Nicol, Heather N. (2007-02-15). "The Importance of Northern Dimension Foreign Policies in the Geopolitics of the Circumpolar North". Geopolitics. 12 (1): 133–165. doi:10.1080/14650040601031206. ISSN 1465-0045.
  6. ^ Kankaanpää, Paula; Young, Oran R. (2012-10-26). "The effectiveness of the Arctic Council". Polar Research. 31: 17176. doi:10.3402/polar.v31i0.17176. ISSN 1751-8369.
  7. ^ Lackenbauer, Whitney (2019-01-01). "Breaking the Ice Curtain? Russia, Canada, and Arctic Security in a Changing Circumpolar World". Breaking the Ice Curtain? Russia, Canada, and Arctic Security in a Changing Circumpolar World.
  8. ^ Filimonova, Nadezhda; Obydenkova, Anastassia; Rodrigues Vieira, Vinicius G. (2023-04-21). "Geopolitical and economic interests in environmental governance: explaining observer state status in the Arctic Council". Climatic Change. 176 (5): 50. doi:10.1007/s10584-023-03490-8. ISSN 1573-1480.
  9. ^ "The Arctic Council". Arctic Council. Retrieved 2023-12-23.
  10. ^ a b Offerdal, Kristine (2011). "The EU in the Arctic: In pursuit of legitimacy and influence". International Journal. 66 (4): 861–877. ISSN 0020-7020. JSTOR 23104398.
  11. ^ "The EU in the Arctic | EEAS". www.eeas.europa.eu. Retrieved 2023-12-24.
  12. ^ "Full text: China's Arctic Policy". english.www.gov.cn. Retrieved 2023-12-24.
  13. ^ https://policycommons.net/artifacts/4829215/the-new-geopolitics-of-the-arctic/5665915/
  14. ^ a b Woon, Chih Yuan (2020-04-01). "Framing the "Polar Silk Road" (冰上丝绸之路): Critical geopolitics, Chinese scholars and the (Re)Positionings of China's Arctic interests". Political Geography. 78: 102141. doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2019.102141. ISSN 0962-6298.
  15. ^ Bennett, Mia M.; Eiterjord, Trym (September 2023). "Remote control? Chinese satellite infrastructure in and above the Arctic global commons". The Geographical Journal. 189 (3): 398–411. doi:10.1111/geoj.12503. ISSN 0016-7398.
  16. ^ https://ir101.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Mearsheimer-Chinas-Unpeaceful-Rise.pdf
  17. ^ "Finding "Win-Win": China's Arctic Policy and What It Means for Canada". Canadian Global Affairs Institute. Retrieved 2023-12-24.
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