Draft:Douglas Haig in 1916

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Field Marshal The Right Honourable
Douglas Haig, 1st Earl Haig
KT GCB OM GCVO KCIE ADC
Field Marshal Douglas Haig
Born19 June 1861
Charlotte Square, Edinburgh
Died29 January 1928 (aged 66)
London
Allegiance United Kingdom
Service/branchBritish Army
Years of service1884–1920
RankField Marshal (1917)

Field Marshal Douglas Haig, 1st Earl Haig, KT, GCB, OM, GCVO, KCIE, ADC, (19 June 1861 – 29 January 1928) led the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) from 1915 to the end of World War I. He was commander during the Battle of the Somme, the battle with one of the highest casualties in British military history.

Prelude to the Somme[edit]

For the first time (2 January), Haig attended church service with George Duncan, who was to have great influence over him. Haig saw himself as God's servant and was keen to have clergymen sent out whose sermons would remind the men that the war dead were martyrs in a just cause.[1] Although sometimes criticized nowadays, e.g. by Laffin who called Haig "blasphemous", such views were not uncommon at the time, on either side, and Duncan later rejected the claim that Haig's religion made him feel infallible, writing that it made him confident and serene but that there was "not the slightest evidence" that it affected military decisions.[2]

Robertson and Kitchener (who thought that a major offensive starting in March could bring decisive victory by August and peace by November[3]) both wanted to concentrate British efforts on the Western Front, unlike many in the Cabinet who would have preferred more effort at Salonika or in Mesopotamia. The War Committee (28 December 1915) had only agreed with some reluctance to make preparations for the Somme Offensive, after doubts from Lloyd George and Balfour (who would have preferred operations against the Turks whilst the Germans exhausted themselves in futile attacks), after Kitchener had stressed the need to cooperate with Britain's allies. Bonar Law backed Robertson at this meeting and again on 13 January 1916, after which Grey also recommended that the Allies attack in the west rather than stand on the defensive.[4]

Haig and Robertson were aware that Britain would have to take on more of the offensive burden as France was beginning to run out of manpower (and perhaps could not last more than another year at the same level of effort), but thought that the Germans might retreat in the west to shorten their line so they could concentrate on beating the Russians, who unlike France and Britain might accept a compromise peace. Haig thought that the Germans had already had plenty of "wearing out" and that a decisive victory was possible in 1916, and urged Robertson (9 Jan) to recruit more cavalry. Haig's preference was to regain control of the Belgian coast by attacking in Flanders to bring the coast and the naval bases at Bruges, Zeebrugge, and Ostend (a view also held by the Cabinet and Admiralty since 1914)[5] into Allied hands and where the Germans would also suffer great loss if they were reluctant to retreat there.[3]

Lloyd George visited Haig at GHQ and afterward, wrote to Haig to say that he had been impressed by his "grip" and by the "trained thought of a great soldier". Subsequent relations between the two men were not to be so cordial. Haig thought Lloyd George "shifty and unreliable".[6]

Haig and Kiggell met Joffre and his chief of staff de Castelnau at Chantilly (14 February). Haig thought that politicians and the public might misunderstand a long period of attrition and thought that only a fortnight of "wearing out", not three months as Joffre had originally wanted, would be needed before the decisive offensive. Arguments continued over the British taking over a longer section of line from the French.[7] Haig had thought that the German troops reported near Verdun were a feint prior to an attack on the British - in fact, the Verdun Offensive began on 21 February.[8] GHQ was still drawing up plans for a British attack in Flanders.[9]

Haig now decided that Verdun had "worn down" the Germans enough and that a decisive victory was possible at once. Rawlinson was more cautious and wanted to seize only the German front line then wait three days, but Haig (who now had more strength than ever before - Griffith, Battle Tactics p. 53 – the appearance of near success at Neuve Chapelle and Loos if anything held up the development of more sophisticated infantry tactics, as it seemed stronger bombardments and reserves closer to hand was all that was needed) overruled him, demanding he aims to seize the front two German lines and push on towards Combles.[10] Rawlinson promised to "have it out with (Haig)" but was reluctant to do so.[11] Travers argued that the BEF got "the worst of both worlds" – a strategy that was not tied to tactical realities (i.e. the length and depth of bombardments) and enough meddling to confuse the Army Commanders.[12] At the Chantilly Conference (December 1915) Foch had tried to tease out Rawlinson's views but Haig had been suspicious that Foch wanted the British to do more fighting whilst the French took credit for the decisive breakthrough.

After Robertson promised that Haig "would not make a fool of himself" (he told Repington that Haig was "a shrewd Scot who would not do anything rash"), the War Committee finally agreed (7 April) to the Somme Offensive.[9] The Cabinet were also less optimistic. Kitchener (like Haig's subordinate Rawlinson) was also somewhat doubtful and would have preferred smaller and purely attritional attacks, but sided with Robertson in telling the Cabinet that the Somme offensive should go ahead. Haig attended a Cabinet meeting in London (15 April) – the politicians were more concerned with the ongoing political crisis over the introduction of conscription, which could potentially have brought down the government – and Haig recorded that Asquith attended the meeting dressed for golf and clearly keen to get away for the weekend.[13]

Memorandum from Haig to the Adjutant General, Lieutenant General Sir Nevil Macready, asking his opinion on possible dates for launching the Somme offensive, 22 May 1916

The French had already insisted on an Anglo-French attack at the Somme where British and French troops were adjacent to one another, although the French component of the attack was gradually scaled back as reinforcements had to be sent to Verdun.[11] Haig would have preferred to delay until 15 August to allow for more training and more artillery to be available. When told of this Joffre shouted at Haig that "the French Army would cease to exist" and had to be calmed down with "liberal doses of 1840 brandy". The British refused to agree to French demands for a joint Anglo-French offensive from the Salonika bridgehead. Eventually – perhaps influenced by reports of French troop disturbances at Verdun – Haig agreed to attack on 29 June (later put back until 1 July). This was just in time, as it later turned out that Petain (commander at Verdun) was warning the French government that the "game was up" unless the British attacked.[14]

The government – concerned at the volume of shipping space being used for fodder - wanted to cut the number of cavalry divisions. Haig opposed this, believing that cavalry would still be needed to exploit the imminent victory. The Cabinet was in fact mistaken, as most of the fodder was for the horses, donkeys, and mules which the BEF still used to move supplies and heavy equipment. Discussing this matter with the King, who thought the war would last until the end of 1917, Haig told him that Germany would collapse by the end of 1916.[15] This round of planning ended with a sharp exchange of letters with the Cabinet - Haig complained of their interfering in military matters and declared that "I am responsible for the efficiency of the Armies in France." Lloyd George thought Haig's letter "perfectly insolent" and that the government "had the right to investigate any matter connected with the war that they pleased".[16]

"It seems to me that troops & material are so embedded in the ground in the trench warfare that a general retreat will be most difficult. We ought, therefore, to be prepared to exploit a success on the lines of 1806" Haig to Robertson (28 May 1916). The tenor of this letter was that his offense was not directed at breakthrough, only at the possibility of exploiting success, and Robertson told ministers (30 May) that "Haig had no idea of any attempt to break through the German lines. It would only be a move to (rescue) the French." Robertson was probably not aware of Haig's insistence, overruling Rawlinson's earlier plan, on bombarding deeper into the German defenses in the hope of "fighting the enemy in the open".[17] Frederick Maurice, who worked under Robertson, wrote (29 June) Haig "does not mean to knock his head against a brick wall, and if he finds he is only making a bulge and meeting with heavy opposition he means to stop and consolidate and try somewhere else".[18]

The Somme: Opening[edit]

Stretcher bearers recovering wounded during the Battle of Thiepval Ridge, September 1916. Photo by Ernest Brooks.

From 1 July to 18 November 1916, Haig directed the British portion of a major Anglo-French offensive at the Somme. An attack of seventeen British divisions was planned, with the infantry poorly trained - even if they didn't advance in the parade ground order of myth (see Prior 2005) Haig and Rawlinson did not impose a uniform standard of tactical training.[10] Charteris was reporting German morale already damaged and Haig hoped (7 June) to win the war by the end of 1916[10] - hoping for a breakthrough, he had a small (2 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions) Reserve Army under Gough ready to exploit.[11]

The Somme lines were well-built as the sector had been quiet for some time. Haig wanted a hurricane bombardment but agreed to Rawlinson's request to shell for a week.[19] The bombardment consisted of 1.5m shells, but because of the greater width of the attack (20 miles) the British bombardment was only half as intense as the much smaller barrage at Neuve Chapelle over a year earlier.[20][21] 1,000 field guns and 233 howitzers were used, along with 180 counterbattery guns, which failed to subdue the 598 German field guns and 246 howitzers[20] or machine guns.[19] Much of the failure was due to shortcomings in munitions: only 900 tons out of the 12,000 used was High Explosive.[19] Around a million of the shells were shrapnel, intended to cut barbed wire (testing on the beach at Calais late in 1915 had shown that cutting wire with prolonged shrapnel bombardment needed exactly calibrated cones of fire and good observation; at this stage of the war, High Explosive shells came only with an impact fuse suitable for attacking fixed targets but which if used against wire simply threw it up into the air to land in a heap back in the resulting crater – the 106 graze fuse which enabled HE shells to explode in mid-air and destroy barbed wire (or human bodies) efficiently was not yet available). Around a third of British shells were duds.[20] Although too much shrapnel was used in the bombardment, Haig was not entirely to blame for this: as early as Jan 1915 Haig had been impressed by evidence of the effectiveness of High Explosive shells and had demanded as many of them as possible from van Donop (Head of Ordnance in the UK).[22]

The first day saw 57,000 British casualties. North of the Bapaume Road losses were terrible, for negligible gain. The Third Army's feint at Gommecourt was a total failure.[23] The 36th (Ulster) Division advanced out into No Mans Land and initially succeeded (although was driven out later) at Thiepval, an area where the bombardment had not worked. The Newfoundlanders lost 91% of their strength, many before they had even reached British front line, let alone crossed No Mans Land. Results were better in the south where the British had the height advantage (allowing them to observe artillery fire) and where the French were able to supply extra artillery support,[23] and it has been suggested that Rawlinson might have captured Trones and Mametz Wood if he had had reserves ready to exploit (Sheffield, Somme 68). Haig initially thought losses were only 40,000[24] and wrongly blamed some of the failure (eg. on VIII Corps sector) on lack of resolve – it took several days for full reports to reach him.[23]

The Somme: Summer Battles[edit]

At a meeting (3 July) Joffre tried to order Haig to renew a major attack attack on Thiepval and Pozieres, but Haig refused, and reminded Joffre that he had no authority to give him orders. Instead, he renewed the attack south of Bapaume Road, where it had been more successful. Rawlinson over-delegated and the result was 46 small attacks and 25,000 casualties over the next fortnight.[25] Haig, initially sceptical, allowed Rawlinson to conduct a night attack on 14 July on Longueval, Bazentin le Grand and Bazentin le Petit. 1,000 artillery pieces of which 311 were heavy howitzers, were used. The attack was on a 6,000 yards front, down from 20,000 yards on 1 July - and 12,000 yards of support trench, down from 300,000 - so the bombardment was five times more intense. Rawlinson only bombarded for five minutes before 3.25am attack, which seized Trones Wood and Bazentin le Petit, but the cavalry failed at High Wood.[26] The Germans sent 42 extra divisions to the Somme in July and August, and launched 330 counterattacks. They suspended major operations at Verdun on 11 July, but the French were keen for Haig to keep attacking. On 29 July Haig justified the battle to the British Cabinet largely in terms of attrition.[27] Instead of calling a halt like previous offensives, this time Haig carried on.[28]

Robertson privately urged caution to to Kiggell (5 July) stressing the need for deliberation and "concentration and not dispersion of artillery fire", and urging Kiggell "not to show this letter to anyone". He again wrote to Kiggell (26 July) urging him not let the Germans "beat you in having the better manpower policy"[29] and Rawlinson (26 July). He had told the Cabinet that the main objective was to relieve the French, not to achieve breakthrough. Henry Wilson thought, probably wrongly, that Robertson was after Haig's job.[30] Robertson felt that he was being given insufficient information to give the politicians, especially during July, the month with the highest British casualties of the entire war, at a time when the German Verdun Offensive was already being scaled back. Haig was reluctant to send Robertson full weekly reports and Robertson complained that Haig's daily telegrams to him contained little more information than the daily press releases. "Not exactly the letter of a CIGS! … He ought to take responsibility also!" was Haig's comment on one such letter (29 July).[31]

Charteris predicted that German morale was sagging and that their reserves would be exhausted in six weeks. It has been suggested that Haig was too willing to listen to him.[32]

Haig was criticised by his predecessor Viscount French and in a paper by Winston Churchill, currently out of office, circulated to the Cabinet on 1 August, criticising the high losses and negligible gains of the Somme. Churchill argued that this would leave Germany freer to win victories elsewhere. Churchill's claim that Allied losses at the Somme exceeded German is now accepted by historians, but at the time Haig attributed Churchill's views to his "taking drugs".[33] Haig's reply, read to the War Committee on 5 August, stated that the Somme needed to continue into the autumn and that another major offensive would be needed the following year. After the episode of the Churchill memorandum, both Robertson and Esher wrote to Haig reminding him of how Robertson was covering Haig's back in London, Robertson reminding Haig of the need to give him "the necessary data with which to reply to the swines" (7 and 8 August).[31]

The period between 15 July to 14 September saw the "forgotten battles", small attacks around High Wood, Delville Wood, Guillemont, "line straightening" for the benefit of the artillery. Fourth Army suffered 82,000 casualties whilst advancing 1,000 yards over a five mile front – 40% more casualties than on 1 July but gaining less ground.[34]

The Somme: Autumn Battles[edit]

Thiepval Ridge was captured (19 August). At this time the Central Powers were being hard pressed by the Brusilov Offensive, and the brief panic caused by the entry of Romania into the war on the Allied side. In the event Romania was quickly crushed with the diversion of only a few German divisions, but not before Falkenhayn had been dismissed as German Chief of Staff (replaced by Hindenburg and Ludendorff, who soon acquired almost dictatorial power in Germany).[35]

Lloyd George visited GHQ on 11 September. Haig wrote to his wife that he had "no great opinion of Lloyd George as a man or a leader". Haig felt Lloyd George had lots of ideas but was too quick to change his mind, and was less clear in thought than Asquith. Whilst at GHQ Lloyd George was keen to talk to the press and be filmed for cinema newsreels (Sassoon joked that he had not been able to find a circus elephant for Lloyd George to be filmed riding).[36] Lloyd George asked Foch in a private interview why the French had performed relatively better – he criticised other British generals, but not Haig personally. Haig, when told of this by Foch, thought this evidence that Lloyd George was "ungentlemanly" but advised Robertson to let the matter drop rather than confront the War Secretary. Instead Haig and his aide Philip Sassoon encouraged anti-Lloyd George articles in the Northcliffe Press.[37] Haig cultivated Spender ("Westminster Gazette" – and later Asquith's biographer), Wickham Steed (The Times Foreign Editor) and Gwynne (Morning Post). For most of 1917 Haig would enjoy the support of the Northcliffe Press.[38] Lloyd George sent Viscount French to Joffre's GQG to inquire about the superiority of French artillery. Haig wrote that "I would not receive Viscount French in my house – I despise him too much personally for that" and was irritated when he learned that Robertson had known in advance of the visit.[39]

Delville Wood started well (3 Sep, brought forward, to Haig's irritation, at a conference on 27 August), but counterattacks drove the British back. The promised French contribution never materialised, which Haig and Gough blamed on French lack of offensive spirit, but were not overly bothered as they were more focussed on the upcoming 15 September push at Flers-Courcelette.[40] Haig and Joffre pushed for a major attack on scale of 1 July. Haig overruled Rawlinson and demanded that two lines be taken, so the artillery was half the intensity of 14 July.[41] 5 cavalry divisions were ready to exploit.

Flers-Courcelette also saw the first use of tanks. Haig was "not the technophobe of popular portrayal" (he also intervened to help develop the Royal Flying Corps, Lewis light machine gun, light and heavy trench mortars) and had ordered 150 tanks (31 July) when he was shown the prototype.[42] Although Haig had underlined Lt-Col Ernest Swinton's advice not to use them "in driblets" he felt "I cannot wait any longer for them and it would be folly not to use every means at my disposal in what is likely to be our crowning effort this year".[43]

Of the promised 75 tanks, only 49 reached France, 32 of which reached the starting point, whilst further breakdowns meant that only 18 saw action, many becoming stranded in shell-holes and as the artillery had left gaps so as not to break up the ground too much they often faced unshelled German defences. Lloyd George later called the premature use of tanks "a foolish blunder" but it has been pointed out that tanks were not mechanically ready even for what they achieved at Cambrai and Amiens (Sixsmith p. 96 tank tactics could hardly be developed without combat experience). Many generals were sceptical but Haig (17 September) demanded 1,000 more - more than he would ever actually have at Cambrai or Amiens - and ordered an independent tank organisation to be set up – for which decision he was "far ahead of his time".[42][43]

However, there was already divergence between MacDonogh and Charteris as to the likelihood of German collapse. Robertson cautioned Kiggell (29 September 1916) not to raise public expectations too much.[44]

In late September 1916 Haig arranged for research facilities to be set up for the benefit of a Sergeant Scheerer who claimed to have invented a death ray which could kill small animals. By November he had been exposed as a fraud, so Haig had him demoted to private and sent to a busy sector of the front.[45]

The Somme: Analysis[edit]

David Stevenson 1914-18 P171 Haig began with an attritional model as a necessary precondition of winning decisive victory. Despite growing doubts in London he persisted with the offensive partly because it was an agreed contribution towards the Allied offensive and partly because of his own excessive optimism (the latter also encouraged in part by the poor advice of his intelligence advisor, John Charteris). His report after the battle was “somewhat lamely”. It contributed to the calling off of Verdun attacks on 11 July, but did not prevent the Germans transferring divisions east to crush Romania. German eyewitness testimony records the effect of Allied bombardments (even though they were less severe than later in the war), but Allied morale may have suffered just as much. The Allies suffered more severe casualties than the Germans, but although these losses were easier for the British to bear than the Germans, they hit the French even harder. Stevenson concludes that the costs to the Allies were disproportionate to the gains, although the battle contributed to a certain extent to the withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line, and to a lesser extent to the German leaders resort to unrestricted submarine warfare and to launch the Hindenburg Programme of armaments production.


Churchill & drugs

P20 Toye the Roar of the Lion In an article in the News of the World (25 Dec 1938) he recalled a famous incident in April 1904 when he had lost his train of thought during a Commons speech on trade unions and had had to sit down (thereafter he usually held a full transcript of his speech in front of him). He wrote that "some charitably suggested drink and others drugs". (Toye comments that members would also have recalled his father Lord Randolph's incoherent speeches in the early 1890s as he descended into mental decay, whether from syphilis or from a brain tumour). P147 Montagu Brown long sunset. Churchill later told AMB that he was said to beat Clemmie so her cries could be heard in the street, was cut by many people had regarded as friends, and was said to be a drug addict, his arm covered in “piqures” SEE ALSO MARGOT BOOK for Lady Diana Manners & Raymond Asquith recreational morphine use.

Wilson - - PUT IN BOOKLIST - Myriad Faces Of War

Pp346-7 Second half of September came on to rain and stopped offensives for ten days, then again from 2 October for the rest of the month. Almost all the ridge taken apart from a bit north of Thiepval. Should have been called off. Trevor Wilson “an exercise in futility [which] appears so obtuse that it raises doubts as to whether [Haig]'s sounder decisions were the result of chance or good judgement.” P347 Haig wrote to Joffre (11 September) “evidence of a growing deterioration in [enemy] morale accumulates daily” and to Robertson (7 October) “It is not possible to say how near to breaking point the enemy may be but he has undoubtedly gone a long way towards it”. Haig ignored the effect on his men’s morale or whether it was possible to exploit German weakness. Hankey wrote during his visit to the Somme (9 September) “On the whole I think our people have an exaggerated opinion of our superiority over the enemy. The Germans are undoubtedly still very strong. They dig better than our men … and consequently their losses are probably far less. The prisoners, of whom I saw hundreds on the roads, are fine, well set-up, intelligent-looking men, with no sign whatsoever of indifferent morale or physique.” P348 Rawlinson recorded Kiggell saying (19 September) that Haig “means to go on until we cannot possibly continue further either from the weather or want of troops”. Rawlinson added “I’m not so sure that he is right”. Rawlinson recorded (6 October) Haig “is bent on continuing the battle until we are forced to stop by the weather indeed he would like to go on all through the winter”. Wilson writes “the Somme campaign had failed”. It had failed to achieve a decisive breakthrough – the Allies now controlled the key ridge but this would be of little use unless the Germans continued to fight for every inch of ground, which Hindenburg and Ludendorff were unwilling to do. P349 The Somme contributed to the relief of Verdun, which happened early on – the French had regained the ground they had lost. It was not necessary for the Allies to keep pushing so hard on the Somme, and the latter offensive cost the French around 200,000 casualties, roughly half what they suffered at Verdun and “contribut[ing] to the[ir] growing enfeeblement”. The Somme proved that Britain was now a major player on the Western Front. Germany suffered nearly 1m casualties on the Western Front in 1916, “little short of calamitous”. But the Allies suffered greater casualties, as Churchill and Hankey pointed out at the time (and contrary to Haig’s claim that German losses exceeded Allied). Allied losses were around 420,000 and 200,000. German officially admitted 500,000 casualties – efforts to bump this up to 680,000 were shown by MJ Williams to be “without foundation”. The “raw material” of German casualty figures no longer exists, so we can never be exactly sure, but there is “no firm ground for doubting that the Allies lost more heavily than the Germans”. P351 - On the whole, Wilson argues, the Somme probably hurt the Germans and the Central Powers more than the Allies.

AJP Taylor (1972) For the Allies, the Somme was “strategically … an unredeemed defeat”. As for the claim that it wore down the Germans, Taylor comments that “so, no doubt, it did, but not to the point of crippling that army as a fighting machine”. Taylor also wrote that such arguments ignore the loss which the Somme inflicted on the British Army, both in numbers and in losing the confident spirit of the volunteer army.[46]

Duffy Through German Eyes p324-5 “entirely unquantifiable loss of contacts which enriched British industry commerce and the arts. F204,000 B420,000 of whom about 150,000 killed. German ”Estimates vary wildly from about 230,000 {NO SOURCE ADD COMMENT} … to a still less credible 680,000”. “Best sources”(Reichasarchiv) put it around 500,000. Allies could afford losses more, and Germans attested to Allied bombardments and the awfulness of the autumn rain and mud, and the inability of G troops to rest as there weren’t enough of them and they were too busy building new trenches for much R&R. “Evidence is oddly inconclusive” as British daily loss rates higher than 3Y but lower than Arras and the Hundred Days. Plus the Somme went on a long time.

Boff Haig's Enemy 2018 - PUT IN BOOKLIST

British 419,654 French 204,253. German losses "a conservative 429,209 and a frankly implausible 680,000. About 500,000 seems roughly right".[47]

pp141-2 "No-one was more aware than [Haig] that his early hopes for a breakthrough and a return to mobile warfare had been dashed". He three objectives, any one of the three enough – relieve Verdun ( - "the weakest of the three [arguments]" wound down from 12 July – four months after Verdun had begun- but had been clearly doomed long before that; Rupprecht had written it off as early as March. It was hardly a "timely" relief of Verdun but it was clear long before 1 July that the British were not going to walk into the trap (PRESUMABLY OF LAUNCHING A PREMATURE ATTACK)), pin down German assets in the west (15 divs went east, 9 of them exhausted, and six fresh ones came west; Germans were hard-pressed and crushed Romania and we don't know how many they could have moved if there had been no Somme), and wear down the enemy. Attrition is the strongest argument whether it was an initial aim of rationalisation after the fact. A German division tended to lose a third of its infantry (3,000 men) during a tour on the Somme. Boff quotes Alexander Watson (Enduring the Great War 2008 pp. 165-8) the Somme inflicted psychological damage on the German Army - it did not break it but that was probably not going to happen at this stage of the war.

p143 British closed the qualitative gap, although Rupprecht thought this was more a case of his own men getting worse, and the British got clumsier again (close formations) by November.

Ian Beckett – The Making of the First World War

p.5, p.241 The British milhist view is "unconvincing" and Prior & Wilson's view is "more realistic" than that of Sheffield 2003.

Strachan intro to Strohn essays on the Somme

p.15 By the end of 1916 Allied strategy appeared to be working, but by July 1917 "the Chantilly strategy was in ruins"

“None of these claims stands up to close scrutiny.” The Somme had been planned long before Verdun. Pinning down troops obvious nonsense. “One Continuous battle” was, Prior writes “the merest sophistry”. On 1 July 14 July, 15 September and early October he had been hoping to win decisive and perhaps even war-winning victory; only very late did the British generals start to talk about the campaign extending into 1917.[48]

Alex Watson – Ring of Steel

P323 “the vast Entente resources produced remarkably modest results” No breakthrough. Haig’s subsequent despatch is “self-exculpatory”. 15 divisions transferred away to other fronts.

P325 “The Entente ... certainly inflicted grievous losses … but it failed to deal a death blow”. German Army peaked in strength in July 1917, 750,000 men stronger than a year earlier “the Entente failed in what was supposed to be its year of attrition” despite their “vast numerical and material superiority”. The German Army’s 1.393,000 killed wounded missing and POW (336,00 of them dead), was 311,000 fewer than the corresponding figure the previous year (totals probably an underestimate but the trend is correct).

P325-6 German Army suffered serious psychological effects – church service attendance was down, sicker, desertion, self-wounding, rumours of proletarian Rhinelanders fragging their officers. The ratio of captured and killed to missing rose. On the Somme and at Verdun in October there were reports of panicked German units fleeing or surrendering.

P326 “The Entente missed an opportunity on the Somme in 1916”. British should have concentrated their efforts and gone for a shallower breakthrough to begin with. The main effect was on morale but Gallwitz reported that the men were on the while still holding out.


World Crisis by Winston Churchill Colonel the Lord Sydenham of Combe, Kennikat Press 1928 reprinted 1970 ISBN 0-8046-1041-X

It “saved Verdun” and “struck terror to the enemy” and enabled the French to regain ground at Verdun later in the year.[49]

Prior Churchill’s World Crisis as History

Joffre claimed that it was he who first suggested the Somme as an area for an attack (26 Dec 1915), very likely as it was where the British and French lines joined and so he could to some extent control the British offensive. Haig wrote to Robertson (3 Jan 1916) that he was researching an attack in this area. Joffre wanted this to be a “wearing out attack” some months before the main French attack. Haig initially still wanted an attack in Flanders simultaneous with the French attack south of the Somme (diary 14 Jan 1916), presumably after the British wearing-out attack on the Somme. However, he wrote to Joffre (1 Feb 1916) that the British contribution on the Somme should be enlarged and simultaneous with the French. Joffre agreed but then Verdun kicked off. Haig initially wrote to Kitchener that he wanted to revert to his plan to attack in Flanders, where strategic objectives were nearer the front, but agreed (25 Feb 1916) to stick to the plan to attack the Somme, albeit with a reduced French contribution. Haig neither chose the Somme battlefield as alleged by Churchill nor strongly resisted it as alleged by his apologists.[50]

Churchill’s criticism of the location is also unrealistic – Loos and Artois were “an industrial wilderness”, so that really only left Flanders and the Somme. Churchill suggested no alternative.[51]

Churchill wrote that the heavy bombardment and the presence of cavalry near the front were signs that a complete breakthrough was sought, contrary to the claims of some apologists. Haig wrote that his object was to achieve “such a victory over the enemy’s forces as will compel him to retreat and thereby open up possibilities of further tactical and strategical success” (Haig to Joffre 10 Feb 1916). When the French contribution was scaled down, Haig lowered his expectations somewhat to Montauban Ridge (just beyond the German second position), although with a possibility of advancing further given favourable “developments” (Haig to Joffre 10 April 1916). However, he told Rawlinson that he should consider reaching Combles on the German third position on the first day (Rawlinson Diary 23 May 1916) – in fact, it did not fall until October. Robertson told the War Committee that “there was no idea of any attempt to break through the German lines, it would only be a move to degager the French” (30 May 1916). Haig also wrote of it having the sole object “of relieving the pressure on Verdun” (1 June and 10 June 1916). He urged Rawlinson to keep the cavalry close in case of a breakthrough into the open country (KIggell memorandum 16 June 1916). He also wrote to Joffre (26 June 1916 of the possibility of reaching Cambrai and Douai, a penetration not achieved until the end of the war.[52]

Had Haig aimed solely at attrition, he would have launched more limited attacks (in fact there were some cases of brigades “failing to attack” as early as 6–7 July and having to be withdrawn). He was saved by the inept policy of German counterattacks.[53]

Churchill laments the lack of camouflage, but all major attacks (as opposed to Messines or Cambrai) were pretty obvious in advance. Churchill was unaware that Rawlinson had insisted on a long bombardment as in his view there was little chance of surprise anyway. If anything Haig and Rawlinson were more culpable than he realised, as they appear to largely ignored intelligence reports that enemy dugouts and wire had not been destroyed (30 June 1916). In fact, Churchill does not mention Rawlinson at all apropos the Somme, possibly because the two men became good friends after 1919.[54]

Churchill, in his criticisms of the First Day of the Somme, did not fully appreciate the lack of information under which senior officers laboured. Churchill argues that the Somme wore out the British more than the Germans, but he partially exonerates Haig for continuing the battle into November on the grounds that he needed to keep pressure off the French and was being fed false intelligence by Charteris. Haig had written to Robertson (8 July) of “serious demoralisation” among the enemy, but in Prior’s view, he ought to have been less gullible later on – mentioned it 11 Sep to Joffre and thought enemy “a long way towards” breaking point (to Robertson 7 October 1916). But he wanted to carry on attacking regardless of the state of the Germans. Rawlinson recorded (19 September) that Kiggell had told him that Haig wanted to carry on “until we cannot possibly continue either from the weather or want of troops. I’m not so sure that he is right.” On 6 October Rawlinson wrote Haig “is bent on continuing the battle until we are forced to stop by the weather indeed he would like to go on all through the winter”. No mention of impending victory or German collapse.[55]

French began its first counterattacks at Verdun on 14 July. Began barrage for a serious attack on 19 October. So the claim that it took the pressure off Verdun doesn’t hold much water.[56]

Beckett British Army and WW1

P301 It may be taken as something “approaching an Entente victory” given the strength of the German defences and that one of the attacking armies was a novice army

The Somme: the End[edit]

Haig's tactics in these battles were considered controversial by many, including the then Secretary of State for War Lloyd George, who felt that he incurred unnecessarily large casualties for little tactical gain. However, Lloyd George was unable to intervene in strategy, as General Sir William Robertson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff had been given direct right of access to the Cabinet, in order to bypass Lloyd George's predecessor Kitchener. At the conference at Calais Lloyd George accused Robertson and the War Office of keeping him in the dark. At the War Committee he urged a shift in efforts to the Balkans.[57]

At a War Committee meeting (3 November 1916) without Robertson, Lloyd George complained that the Allies had not achieved any definite success, that the Germans had recovered the initiative, had gained more territory and still had 4m men in reserve. On this occasion Asquith backed him and the committee's conclusion, which was neither printed nor circulated, was that "The offensive on the Somme, if continued next year, was not likely to lead to decisive results, and that the losses might make too heavy a drain on our resources having regard to the results to be anticipated." It was agreed to consider offensives in other theatres.[58]

Throughout the duration of the battle, the French insisted that Haig continue the Somme offensive, even after they went on the offensive at Verdun in October 1916. On 14 November Beaumont Hamel, one of the original targets for the first day, was taken.[59]

The Paris Conference opened on 16 November. (Haig and Joffre had met at Chantilly the previous day and had agreed to resume the Somme offensive in 1917, with the British again playing the major role[60]). Lloyd George wanted more effort at Salonika but couldn't get his way.[61]

The Somme ended on 18 November, having pushed the German front line back 12 km (7.5 mi) and failed to reach Bapaume, an objective for the first day, and with the BEF having suffered an estimated 420,000 casualties (there were also another 200,000 or so French casualties), almost as many as the average BEF ration strength in 1915. The campaign also resulted in heavy casualties to the German Army that it could ill afford. Charteris estimated German Somme casualties at 680,000 (i.e. exceeding total Allied losses - modern estimates of German losses are lower). Yet the Germans had conquered Romania and by moving to full war mobilisation their Army had increased in size from 169 ½ divisions on 1 June to 197 divisions (of which 70 were in the East, up from 47 ½ on 1 June). Haig claimed (21 November) that 95 German divisions had been defeated on the Somme front, some of them two or three times, that German losses exceeded Allied (sic) and that "an appreciable proportion of the German Army are now practically beaten men, ready to surrender".[62]

Charteris' had claimed (13 October) that British divisions inflicted more loss on the Germans than French divisions, and claimed that the Germans, their morale weaker, were fighting less hard than earlier in the year.[63] By contrast War Office reports in November and December were perfectly clear that the French were suffering much more favourable loss ratios than the British on the Somme, although they attributed better French artillery skills to the French artillery having only increased 2.5 times in size since the start of the war, whereas the British had increased tenfold.[62]

Haig visited London (22 November) and found the politicians concerned the Lansdowne Memorandum calling for peace as Britain could not continue to fight beyond autumn 1917 - Haig thought Germany would be beaten by then anyway. Haig met with the French generals again at GQG (29 November) and agreed with Joffre and Castlenau that decisive results were possible (Foch thought not).[61] He claimed (16 December) that the enemy were "much more ready to surrender" than six months earlier, so the cavalry needed to be kept up to strength.[64] British artillery had grown more effective, and the Germans were less able to absorb losses than the Allies[65]

In modern times the Somme has come to be seen as a "national cataclysm" "the tactics of the Stone Age" (the contemporary words of Lovat Fraser as quoted by Laffin). But despite Haig's many mistakes, including slowness to learn the correct concentration of artillery needed, it is regarded by some historians as costly but important Allied victory – Falkenhayn fell from power, Ludendorff admitted that the retreat to the Hindenburg Line was because Germany did not have the manpower to withstand further "Somme fighting" and Germany was driven to the gamble of unrestricted submarine warfare.[66] Haig's preferred option for 1917 was to renew the attack at the Somme, and failing that his long-cherished plan for a Flanders attack.[67] Asquith (21 November 1916) agreed to an attack towards Ostend and Zeebrugge and in December 1916 Joffre also agreed.[59]

Asquith resigned as Prime Minister (6 December). Haig thought "poor old Squiff" had "more capacity and brainpower than any of the other (politician)s" but welcomed the greater vigour of Lloyd George, who became Prime Minister on 7 December, although he deplored his wish to divert resources to Russia, Palestine or Salonika, concerns which were shared by Robertson and by the King's adviser Clive Wigram.[68]

References[edit]

  1. ^ Groot 1988, pp. 218–9
  2. ^ Wiest 2005, p. 43
  3. ^ a b Groot 1988, pp. 223–6, 230, 232
  4. ^ Woodward, 1998, pp. 38–40
  5. ^ Terraine, J. The Road to Passchendaele, p. 9.
  6. ^ Groot 1988, p. 226
  7. ^ Groot 1988, pp. 228–9
  8. ^ Groot 1988, p. 230
  9. ^ a b Woodward, 1998, pp. 40–2
  10. ^ a b c Wiest 2005, pp. 48–50
  11. ^ a b c Groot 1988, pp. 247–9
  12. ^ Travers 1987, pp. 111, 189
  13. ^ Groot 1988, pp. 238–9.
  14. ^ Groot 1988, pp. 243–4
  15. ^ Groot 1988, p. 243
  16. ^ Groot 1988, p. 245
  17. ^ Woodward, 1998, pp. 42–3
  18. ^ Woodward, 1998, p. 53
  19. ^ a b c Groot 1988, p. 250
  20. ^ a b c Wiest 2005, pp. 50-1
  21. ^ Prior & Wilson 1996, p. 21
  22. ^ Groot 1988, p. 177
  23. ^ a b c Groot 1988, p. 252
  24. ^ Wiest 2005, p. 54
  25. ^ Wiest 2005, pp. 54–5
  26. ^ Wiest 2005, pp. 55–6
  27. ^ Wiest 2005, pp. 57–8
  28. ^ Groot 1988, p. 254
  29. ^ Woodward, 1998, pp. 52, 55
  30. ^ Groot 1988, p. 256
  31. ^ a b Woodward, 1998, pp. 55–7
  32. ^ Groot 1988, p. 260
  33. ^ Groot 1988, p. 257
  34. ^ Wiest 2005, pp. 58–9
  35. ^ Groot 1988, p. 262
  36. ^ Groot 1988, p. 263
  37. ^ Groot 1988, pp. 260, 264
  38. ^ Groot 1988, p. 272
  39. ^ Groot 1988, p. 273
  40. ^ Groot 1988, p. 265
  41. ^ Wiest 2005, pp. 59–60
  42. ^ a b Wiest 2005, p. 62
  43. ^ a b Groot 1988, p. 266
  44. ^ Woodward, 1998, pp. 30–3, 55–7
  45. ^ Groot 1988, p. 268
  46. ^ Taylor 1972, p. 140.
  47. ^ Boff 2018, p. 141.
  48. ^ Prior & Wilson 2005, p. 301.
  49. ^ Sydenham 1928, p. 59.
  50. ^ Prior 1983, p. 214-5.
  51. ^ Prior 1983, p. 215-6.
  52. ^ Prior 1983, p. 216.
  53. ^ Prior 1983, p. 216-7.
  54. ^ Prior 1983, p. 217-8.
  55. ^ Prior 1983, p. 219-20.
  56. ^ Prior 1983, p. 221.
  57. ^ Groot 1988, p. 273–4
  58. ^ Woodward, 1998, pp. 71–2
  59. ^ a b Wiest 2005, p. 67
  60. ^ Groot 1988, p. 289
  61. ^ a b Groot 1988, pp. 279–81
  62. ^ a b Woodward, 1998, pp. 67–70
  63. ^ Groot 1988, pp. 270–1
  64. ^ Groot 1988, p. 280
  65. ^ Groot 1988, p. 275
  66. ^ Wiest 2005, pp. 63–5
  67. ^ Prior & Wilson 1996, p. 27
  68. ^ Groot 1988, pp. 281–2

Bibliography[edit]

  • Bond, Brian and Cave, Nigel (eds) Haig – A Reappraisal 70 Years On. Pen & Sword. (2009 edition). ISBN 184415887
  • Carlyon, Les The Great War (Sydney: Pan MacMillan, 2005)
  • Corrigan, Gordon. Mud, Blood & Poppycock (London: Cassell, 2002) ISBN 0-304-36659-5
  • Dixon, Dr. Norman F. On the Psychology of Military Incompetence Jonathan Cape Ltd 1976 / Pimlico 1994
  • Duffy, C. (2007). Through German Eyes, The British and the Somme 1916. London: Phoenix. ISBN 978-0-7538-2202-9.
  • French, David Raising Churchill's Army Oxford 2000
  • Gollin Alfred Milner : Proconsul in Politics (Macmillan, London, 1964)
  • Green, Andrew – Writing the Great War, (Frank Cass, London, 2003), ISBN 0-7146-8430-9
  • Hart, Peter (2008). 1918: A Very British Victory, Phoenix Books, London. ISBN 978-0-7538-2689-8
  • Holmes, Richard. Tommy (London: HarperCollins, 2004) ISBN 0-00-713752-4
  • Keegan, John. The First World War. Pimlico. 1999. ISBN 0-7126-6645-1
  • Neillands, Robin The Death of Glory: the Western Front 1915 (John Murray, London, 2006) ISBN 978-0-7195-6245-7
  • Sheffield, Gary, Forgotten Victory. The First World War: Myths and Realities (Headline Review, 2002), p. 263
  • Travers, Tim The Killing Ground: The British Army, The Western Front and The Emergence of Modern War 1900–1918 (Allen & Unwin 1987)
  • Travers, Tim How the War Was Won (Routledge, London, 1992) ISBN – 0-415-07628-5; (Pen and Sword, London, July 2005), ISBN 978-1-84415-207-0
  • Woodward, David R "Field Marshal Sir William Robertson", Westport Connecticut & London: Praeger, 1998, ISBN 0-275-95422-6

Biographies[edit]

  • Arthur, Sir George Lord Haig (London: William Heinemann, 1928)
  • De Groot, Gerard Douglas Haig 1861–1928 (Larkfield, Maidstone: Unwin Hyman, 1988)
  • Harris, J.P. Douglas Haig and the First World War. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008. ISBN 978-0-521-89802-7
  • Marshall-Cornwall, General Sir James Haig as Military Commander (London: Batsford, 1973)
  • Mead, Gary, The Good Soldier. The Biography of Douglas Haig (London: Atlantic Books, 2008) ISBN 978-1-84354-281-0
  • Reid, Walter. Architect of Victory: Douglas Haig (Birlinn Ltd, Edinburgh, 2006.) ISBN 1-84158-517-3
  • Sheffield, Gary, "The Chief" (Aurum, London, 2011) ISBN 978-1-84513-691-8
  • Sixsmith, E.K.G. Douglas Haig (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1976)
  • Terraine, John. Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier. (London: Hutchinson, 1963) ISBN 0-304-35319-1
  • Warner, Philip Field Marshal Earl Haig (London: Bodley Head, 1991; Cassell, 2001)
  • Winter, Denis Haig's Command (London: Viking, 1991)

Primary sources[edit]

  • Charteris, Brigadier-General John. Field Marshal Earl Haig. (London: Cassell, 1929)
  • Charteris, Brigadier-General John. Haig. (London: Duckworth, 1933)
  • Haig, Countess The Man I Knew (Edinburgh & London: The Moray Press, 1936)
  • Haig, F-M Sir Douglas Sir Douglas Haig's Despatches (December 1915-April 1919). Ed. by Lt.-Col. J.H. Boraston, OBE, Private Secretary to Earl Haig. Dent. 1919
  • Secrett, Sergeant T Twenty-Five Years with Earl Haig (London: Jarrods, 1929)
  • Sheffield, Gary & Bourne, Douglas Haig War Diaries and Letters 1914-18, (Phoenix, London, 2005) ISBN 0-7538-2075-7

External links[edit]

Wikimedia Commons has media related to Douglas Haig in 1916.
Wikiquote has quotations related to Douglas Haig, 1st Earl Haig.


Category:1861 births Category:1928 deaths Category:People from Edinburgh Category:British field marshals Category:British Army personnel of the Mahdist War Category:British Army personnel of the Second Boer War Category:British Army generals of World War I Category:Earls in the Peerage of the United Kingdom Category:Alumni of Brasenose College, Oxford Category:Graduates of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst Category:Scottish Presbyterians Category:Chancellors of the University of St Andrews Category:Rectors of the University of St Andrews Category:Knights Commander of the Order of the Indian Empire Category:Knights Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath Category:Knights Grand Cross of the Royal Victorian Order Category:Knights of the Thistle Category:People educated at Clifton College Category:Scottish soldiers Category:7th Queen's Own Hussars officers Category:17th Lancers officers Category:17th/21st Lancers officers Category:King's Own Scottish Borderers officers Category:Royal Horse Guards officers Category:Recipients of the Order of St. George Category:Recipients of the Order of Prince Danilo I Category:Members of the Order of Merit

Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Douglas_Haig_in_1916&oldid=1224749116"